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The lead article in this issue is Professor Charles Weisselberg’s annualreview of the key criminal-law cases decided by the United StatesSupreme Court during the past Term of the Court (the Term that began
in October 2009 and ended with the last decisions on June 30, 2010). This is
the third year we’ve had the benefit of Professor Weisselberg’s analysis, and I
hope you will take advantage of it if you need to keep up-to-date on criminal-
law developments in the United States.
Prof. Weisselberg not only summarizes the key cases, but also notes where
things may go from here or ways in which judges may need to react. For
example, in addition to noting the Court’s holding in Padilla v. Kentucky that
a criminal-defense lawyer must advise the defendant when the deportation
consequences of a conviction are clear, Prof.
Weisselberg also notes that trial judges may
want to add to their scripts in plea hearings a
question about whether the defendant has
consulted with counsel about the possible
immigration consequences of the plea and
conviction.
Next in the issue is an American Judges
Association White Paper. AJA President Mary
Celeste took on the task of putting all of the
debates over judicial-selection systems in con-
text—a context both of American history and
of recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions. Her goal was to identify challenges judges may face no matter the selec-
tion system, especially in light of recent developments in and out of court. 
If you have even a passing interest in the debate over judicial-selection
methods—or if you have wondered how the recent United States Supreme
Court opinions on the limits on judicial speech or judicial-recusal standards
may affect you—this White Paper will serve as an excellent overview for you.
After you’ve read it, if you want to go further, take a look at the special issue
on judicial-selection recently published by the Litigation Section of the State
Bar of Texas (available on the web—see page 112). And then wait for the next
issue of Court Review, in which we expect to have an update on recent devel-
opments by Georgetown law professor Roy Schotland, a leading expert on
judicial-selection systems and election law.
Our issue concludes with a winning essay from the AJA’s law-student writ-
ing competition. Jessica Wang, a UCLA law student, reviews the admissibility
questions that arise from remote-electronic traffic devices that take still pho-
tos or video of what’s taking place on the roadways.—Steve Leben
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the work-
ing judges of the United States and Canada.  In each issue,
we hope to provide information that will be of use to
judges in their everyday work, whether in highlighting
new procedures or methods of trial, court, or case man-
agement, providing substantive information regarding an
area of law likely to be encountered by many judges, or by
providing background information (such as psychology or
other social science research) that can be used by judges
in their work.  Guidelines for the submission of manu-
scripts for Court Review are set forth on page 110.  Court
Review reserves the right to edit, condense, or reject mate-
rial submitted for publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact January Serda at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit:  Mary Watkins (mayrswatkinsphoto@earth-
link.net). The cover photo is the United States Court
House in Jefferson City, Missouri, which was completed
in 1934 and remains in use by the United States District
Court for the Western District of Missouri.  
©2011, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185-4147.  Points of view or
opinions expressed in Court Review are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the positions of
the National Center for State Courts or the American
Judges Association.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
Cite as: 46 CT. REV. ___ (2009-2010).
66 Court Review - Volume 46  
Court Review
T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  T H E  A M E R I C A N  J U D G E S  A S S O C I A T I O N
E D I T O R ’ S  N O T E
Volume 46,  Issue 3 2009-2010
This issue of Court Review contains the AJA White Paper The
Debate over the Selection and Retention of Judges: How Judges Can
Ride the Wave, and the next issue is scheduled to have an arti-
cle by Professor Roy Schotland discussing the recent 2010 judi-
cial elections.  The information contained in these two articles
should give judges information that could assist in retaining
their employment. 
Aside from being a full-blown politician, being a judge is
probably one of the few jobs where even with exemplary per-
formance you could be ousted for reasons unre-
lated to your performance.  Politics, money, and
data all play a role in the retention or election of
a judge. With regards to politics, one need not
look any further than what happened in this past
election cycle to the Iowa State Supreme Court
justices or the New Jersey governor’s announce-
ment that he will be  withholding appointments
to the state supreme court of known Democrats.
With regards to money, as an elected judge you
may face a rival candidate who could be a subpar
individual but have an enormous war chest.  And with regards
to data, as a merit judge you may face a “do not retain” by a
judicial performance commission that may be based upon sta-
tistically insignificant data collection. 
So how do judges ward off these potential challenges and
keep their jobs? I recommend a continued membership in the
AJA for starters. There is not only power in numbers, but a
myriad of available resources through the AJA.  The AJA is a
member organization of the National Center for State Courts,
along with 25 other national court-related organizations,
including the Conference of Chief Justices, the Conference of
State Court Administrators, the National Association for Court
Management, and the National Association of State Judicial
Educators.  The AJA publishes White Papers and the Court
Review to keep judges abreast of pertinent issues facing them;
responds as the Voice of the Judiciary® to national media con-
cerns and questions related to judges and the courts; comments
on state proposals to modify laws affecting the judiciary; has an
informative website; holds well-renowned educational confer-
ences; and is a member of “Justice at Stake,” an organization
that serves as a “watchdog” of all initiatives across
the country that may affect the courts and the
judiciary.  
If knowledge is power, with approximately
2,000 members from mostly the United States and
some from Canada, there is not a bigger and bet-
ter knowledgeable judicial organization in North
America than the AJA on matters related to the
judiciary.  So if you are a member, stay and con-
tinue to renew; if you are not a member or your
membership has lapsed, join or rejoin. Not only
will you learn how to keep your job, by attending the AJA con-
ferences you will strengthen your knowledge about substantive
law while simultaneously meeting members from every region
of the United States and Canada at every level. Get involved as
there are committees on almost every pertinent judicial subject
matter, including domestic violence, education, access to jus-
tice, and the newly developing criminal and juvenile justice
committee.   I hope to see you at one of our upcoming confer-
ences (see below and the back cover), and I hope that you
enjoy this issue of Court Review.
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Issues that are hot one Term are sometimes cold the next.  Incontrast with the 2008 Term—when the Court took on auto-mobile searches, the scope of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule, and the Confrontation Clause—the big cases of
2009-2010 addressed different issues.  This past year will be
remembered for decisions on the right to counsel for immigrant
defendants, the Eighth Amendment and juveniles, the applica-
tion to the states of the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms, and key decisions on jury-trial rights.  While the
2008 Term gave us Montejo v. Louisiana1— an important hold-
ing on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and police inter-
rogation—this year the Court returned to interrogation but
through the Fifth Amendment.  The justices decided three
Miranda2 cases, one of which may significantly alter police
practices. This article reviews some of the most significant
criminal-law-related opinions of the Supreme Court’s 2009
Term, emphasizing those decisions that have the greatest
impact upon the states.  The article concludes with a brief pre-
view of the current Term.
SECOND AMENDMENT
One of the blockbusters of the Term was McDonald v. City of
Chicago, Ill.,3 which applied the Second Amendment right to
keep and bear arms to the states.  Two years earlier, the Court
had decided District of Columbia v. Heller,4 finding that the
Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and
bear arms.  Heller struck down a District of Columbia law that
essentially prohibited the possession of handguns in the home.
Almost immediately after Heller came the question whether this
right should be applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Five justices have now answered in the affirma-
tive, though no single theory commanded a majority.   Perhaps
the most interesting part of the decision is the discussion of the
incorporation and related doctrines.  (Non-enthusiasts may
wish to skip ahead.)
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, though parts
of the opinion represent the views of only a plurality (with
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Chief Justice Roberts joining
Justice Alito).  The opinion contains a lengthy review of the his-
tory of the incorporation doctrine, as well as the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The plural-
ity turned aside an argument that the Court should reconsider
the interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause pro-
vided in the Slaughter-House Cases.5 There the Court gave the
Clause a narrow reading, holding that it protects those rights
that owe their existence to the federal government, federal laws,
or the character of the nation, but that the Clause does not pro-
tect other fundamental rights.  The plurality in McDonald saw
“no need to reconsider that interpretation,” and turned to the
question of whether the Second Amendment right should be
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6 After reviewing the history and framework of
the incorporation doctrine (perhaps necessary because no
incorporation cases had reached the Court for decades), the
majority found that the right to keep and bear arms is funda-
mental to our scheme of ordered liberty and is deeply rooted in
our nation’s history and tradition.  The plurality concluded that
the right to keep and bear arms is incorporated through the Due
Process Clause.  Justice Thomas provided the fifth vote for the
application of this right to the states, but under a different the-
ory.  While he joined the plurality’s opinion describing the
incorporation doctrine and characterizing the right to keep and
bear arms as fundamental and deeply rooted in history, he
would have revisited the Slaughter-House Cases and held that
the right is guaranteed by the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
as a privilege of American citizenship.
Justice Stevens, in his last dissenting opinion, agreed that the
Court should not reconsider the Slaughter-House Cases, but saw
the issue before the Court in terms of substantive due process.
He would have found that the right to keep and bear arms is not
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.  Justice Scalia, who
joined the plurality, also wrote separately to challenge Justice
Stevens’s views.  Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Sotomayor), relying upon some of Justice Stevens’s analysis,
would have held that the right to keep and bear arms is not so
fundamental or rooted in history that it should be incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
applied to the states.
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the United States Supreme Court
in the 2009-2010 Term, 
and a Look Ahead
Charles D. Weisselberg
Footnotes 
1. 129 S.Ct. 2079 (2009).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. 130 S.Ct. 3020 (2010).
4. 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008).
5. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
6. 130 S.Ct. at 3030-31.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The previous Term gave us several Fourth Amendment
blockbusters, such as Arizona v. Gant7 (vehicle searches inci-
dent to arrest) and Herring v. United States8 (the exclusionary
rule and good-faith reliance on information in a computer data-
base).  This Term, by contrast, saw few Fourth Amendment
issues.  In the one case with far-reaching potential, the justices
avoided the most significant question.
City of Ontario v. Quon9—the case that wasn’t—raised the
question of whether a public employee has a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in communications sent and received on his
government-provided pager.  Quon, a SWAT team officer, was
issued a text pager by his department, with a monthly limit of
how many characters could be sent or received without incur-
ring additional fees.  Quon went over his allotment several
times.  At one point, he was told that he could pay for the
excess usage rather than have to city audit his messages, and he
paid up.  However, the City eventually decided to audit usage
to see if the existing character limit was too low.  The wireless
company sent transcripts of the messages to the City, which dis-
covered that many of Quon’s messages were not work related,
and some were sexually explicit.  He was disciplined for violat-
ing rules by pursuing personal matters while on duty.  Quon
brought a civil-rights action; two other plaintiffs were people
who had communicated by text with Quon—his wife and a fel-
low officer with whom he was romantically involved.
The case attracted much attention because of the question
whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
electronic messages sent and received on his employer’s equip-
ment.  On the facts of the case, that was not an easy question.
Quon’s department had a computer policy in place making clear
that the City had the right to monitor and log all network activ-
ity, including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice.
But text pagers are not computers.  The City initially told its
employees that it would treat text messages just like e-mails.
However, this notice was potentially undercut by the arrange-
ment that allowed employees, such as Quon, to pay for any
overages without audits.
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court declined to
reach the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy question.  Rather,
the justices assumed arguendo that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the text messages, that the City’s
review of the transcript constituted a search within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment, and that the principles that
apply to a government employer’s search of an employee’s phys-
ical office also apply when the employer intrudes upon privacy
in the electronic sphere.  With these assumptions, the Court
simply found that the City conducted a reasonable search.  
There was some debate among members of the Court as to
whether to follow the approach by the plurality in O’Connor v.
Ortega.10 O’Connor addressed the framework for Fourth
Amendment claims against
employers.  The first step of
the analysis is determining
whether there is an expecta-
tion of privacy because some
government offices may be so
open that no such expectation
is reasonable, considering the
“operational realities of the
workplace.”11 Justice Scalia
joined in most of Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Quon,
but wrote separately to argue
that the “operational realities” rubric in O’Connor is “standard-
less and unsupported.”12 In the end, however, the Court said
that under the approach of either the O’Connor plurality or
Justice Scalia (who said the inquiry should be whether the
Fourth Amendment applies in general to such messages on
employer-issued pagers), the outcome would be the same.
The most significant aspect of Quon is simply how reluctant
the justices were to decide about the reasonable expectation of
privacy.  The opinion expressly noted their reluctance:  “The
judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth
Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role
in society has become clear.”  Further, “[r]apid changes in the
dynamics of communication and information transmission are
evident not just in the technology itself but in what society
accepts as proper behavior.”13 Athough Justice Scalia chided
the Court for this discussion—saying “[t]he-times-they-are-a-
changin’ is a feeble excuse for a disregard of duty”14—even he
would not have reached the reasonable expectation of privacy
question.
There was one other Fourth Amendment decision in the
Term.  In Michigan v. Fisher,15 the Court summarily reversed the
Michigan Court of Appeals, and found that officers who entered
a home without a warrant were reasonable in doing so.  In a per
curiam opinion, the justices expanded on Brigham City v.
Stuart,16 where officers had entered a home to assist an injured
adult and stop a fight.  In Fisher, police responded to a report
of a disturbance.  They found a pickup truck in the driveway
with its front smashed, damaged fence posts, and three broken
windows in the house.  They saw some blood on the hood of
the pickup and Fisher inside the home screaming and throwing
things.  When an officer entered the home, Fisher pointed a
gun at him and was later charged for that act.  Under the cir-
cumstances, the majority found, the police had an objectively
reasonable basis for entering the home.  Justice Stevens, joined
by Justice Sotomayor, dissented.  They pointed to the findings
of the trial judge, who was not persuaded that the officer had
an objectively reasonable basis for believing that entering the
home was necessary to avoid serious injury.
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7. 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).
8. 129 S.Ct. 695 (2009).
9. 130 S.Ct. 2619 (2010).
10. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
11. 130 S.Ct. at 2628 (quoting O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 718). 
12. 130 S.Ct. at 2634 (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. 130 S.Ct. at 2629.
14. 130 S.Ct. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring).
15. 130 S.Ct. 546 (2009).
16. 547 U.S. 398 (2006).
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significant aspect
of Quon is simply
how reluctant the
justices were to
decide about 
the reasonable
expectation 
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FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Court decided a trio of
Miranda cases this term.  Two of
the three are modest holdings.
Florida v. Powell17 and Maryland
v. Shatzer18—decided a day
apart—addressed the adequacy
of warnings and when an invo-
cation of the right to counsel
may cease to be effective.  The third case, Berghuis v.
Thompkins,19 is a blockbuster that may transform interrogation
practices.
In Powell, officers advised the defendant that he had the right
to talk with a lawyer “before answering” any questions and that
he had “the right to use any of these rights at any time . . . dur-
ing this interview.”  He was not expressly told that he could have
an attorney present throughout the interrogation, and so Powell
claimed that the warning omitted a required admonition.  Not
so, said the Court, in a 7-2 decision authored by Justice
Ginsburg.  Citing California v. Prysock20 and Duckworth v.
Eagan,21 the majority reiterated that the inquiry is simply
whether the warnings reasonably convey the rights set out in
Miranda, but there is no required formulation of those rights.
The warnings given by Florida police were adequate.  “In com-
bination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s right
to have an attorney present, not only at the outset of interroga-
tion, but at all times.”22 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer,
dissented.   They concluded that when the warnings were given
their most natural reading, the catchall clause did not meaning-
fully convey Powell’s rights.  Justice Stevens also would have
found no jurisdiction to review the Florida Supreme Court’s
decision (finding the warning inadequate), since that court also
based its conclusion on state constitutional grounds.
Shatzer answered a longstanding question.  In Edwards v.
Arizona,23 the Court held that officers may not interrogate a sus-
pect who has invoked the right to counsel unless the suspect ini-
tiates contact with police.  But how long does an Edwards invo-
cation last?  As it turns out, not forever.
Shatzer was serving a sentence when he was questioned by a
detective about an allegation that he had sexually abused his
son.  Shatzer asked for a lawyer, and the questioning ceased.
Two and a half years later, a different detective learned more
information and wanted to question Shatzer.  He went to the
prison and initiated questioning.  This time Shatzer waived his
rights.  Shatzer made a statement that was introduced against
him at trial.  The Supreme Court unanimously upheld his con-
viction.
In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court described
Edwards and its progeny as “not a constitutional mandate, but
judicially prescribed prophylaxis.”  Such a rule applies where its
benefits outweigh the costs.  The benefits—preserving the
integrity of a suspect’s choice and preventing badgering—“are
measured by the number of coerced confessions it suppresses
that otherwise would have been admitted.”24 Where a suspect
has been released from pretrial custody and returned to his nor-
mal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation,
an extension of Edwards “would not significantly increase the
number of genuine coerced confessions excluded” but increases
the costs by excluding voluntary confessions.25 After conclud-
ing that a break in custody may terminate the Edwards protec-
tions, the majority determined that it was appropriate to fix a
specific period of time to give clear guidance to police.  The
Court set that period at 14 days.  “That provides plenty of time
for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult
with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive
effects of his prior custody.”26 In another part of the opinion, the
Court determined that Shatzer’s release back into the general
population was a break in Miranda custody.  Justice Thomas
concurred, but would not have extended the Edwards presump-
tion for 14 days following a break in custody.  Justice Stevens
also concurred, although he suggested that courts should look
to other concrete events or factors in addition to the passage of
time, such as whether a suspect could actually seek legal advice
or whether police honored a commitment to provide counsel.
Berghuis v. Thompkins27 completes the trio and overshadows
the other two.  Southfield, Michigan, police officers wanted to
question Thompkins about a shooting.  Thompkins was arrested
in Ohio, and the officers traveled there to interrogate him.  They
handed Thompkins a form advising him of his rights, which he
refused to sign.  Thompkins remained largely silent for almost 3
hours of the interrogation.  After about 2 hours and 45 minutes,
he gave incriminating responses to questions about whether he
believed in God and prayed to God to forgive him for shooting
the victim.  State courts rejected Thompkins’s Miranda claim,
ruling that Thompkins had neither invoked nor waived his
rights at the time before he implicitly waived them by respond-
ing.  He filed a federal habeas corpus petition.  The U.S. Court
of Appeals determined that the ruling was contrary to clearly
established federal law, and Thompkins should be granted relief.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.  
The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy.
Although Michigan had primarily argued that the state court rul-
ings were entitled to deference on federal habeas corpus review,
the majority went further.  Following the lead of then-Solicitor
General Elena Kagan, who submitted an amicus brief, the Court
instead extended the holding in Davis v. United States.28 In
Davis, the defendant had initially waived his Miranda rights but
subsequently made ambiguous statements indicating he might
want counsel; these statements were insufficient to require
police to cease questioning.  Thompkins extended the unam-
biguous invocation rule of Davis to the right to remain silent as
well as to the initial invocation or waiver stage of an interroga-
17. 130 S.Ct. 1195 (2010).
18. 130 S.Ct. 1213 (2010).
19. 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010).
20. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
21. 492 U.S. 195 (1989).
22. Powell, 130 S.Ct. at 1205.
23. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
24. 130 S.Ct. at 1220.
25. Id. at 1221-22.
26. Id. at 1223.
27. 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010).
28. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
Berghuis v.
Thompkins is a
blockbuster that
may transform
interrogation 
practices.
29. 130 S.Ct. at 2260.
30. For a discussion of the difference between a suspect merely
remaining silent and remaining silent but triggering an offi-
cer’s duty to cease questioning, see Laurent Sacharoff,
Miranda’s Hidden Right, available at:  http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1711410.
31. 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
32. 130 S.Ct. at 2264.
33. Id. at 2262.
34. Id. at 2263.
tion.  The Court found “good reason to require an accused who
wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unam-
biguously,” noting that this avoids difficulties of proof and pro-
vides guidance to officers.29 Thus, after a suspect is advised of
his rights, he or she must unambiguously invoke either the right
to remain silent or the right to counsel in order for officers to
have a duty to cease questioning.30 A suspect may not invoke
the right to remain silent through silence, so Thompkins’ refusal
to talk for almost 3 hours was insufficient to require police to
curtail questioning.
The majority held that Thompkins’ silence was not an invo-
cation, and that his later statements affirmatively established
waiver.  Relying upon North Carolina v. Butler31 for the proposi-
tion that a waiver can be implied through conduct, the majority
held that “a suspect who has received and understood the
Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights,
waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced state-
ment to the police.”32 Although a valid implied waiver requires
that the suspect understand his rights, the Court essentially
placed the burden on the defendant to show a lack of under-
standing.33 The Court found that Thompkins understood his
rights, and thus knew what he was doing when he spoke.  “If
Thompkins wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing
in response to [the detective’s]
questions, or he could have
unambiguously invoked his
Miranda rights and ended the
interrogation.  The fact that
Thompkins made a statement
about three hours after receiv-
ing a Miranda warning does
not overcome the fact that he
engaged in a course of conduct
indicating waiver.”34
Justice Sotomayor wrote a
lengthy dissent, in which she was joined by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer.  She observed that the interrogation was
very one-sided, nearly a monologue by the officers.  Thompkins
refused to sign a form and did not respond affirmatively to inter-
rogation tactics, such as an invitation to tell his side of the story.
On these facts, she would not have found a course of conduct
sufficient to carry the prosecution’s burden of establishing
waiver.  The dissenting justices also disagreed with the exten-
sion of Davis, noting a number of federal and state courts that
have declined to apply a clear-statement rule when a suspect has
not first given an express waiver of rights, and arguing that Davis
Thompkins leads
to an important
question:  will an
implied Miranda
waiver also waive
a suspect's Sixth
Amendment
rights?
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35. Id. at 2272 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
36. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
37. For a debate about this and other points, see Charles D.
Weisselberg & Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent,
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/debate.php?did=38.
38. 130 S.Ct. at 1113 (emphasis added).
39. 129 S.Ct. 2079 (2009).
40. 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
41 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Paris v. Carlton, 2010 WL 1257970, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 30206 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
43. 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010).
44. Id. at 1478.
45. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
should not be applied to the
right to remain silent. The
warnings themselves do not
tell suspects that they need to
use particular language to
invoke the right to remain
silent, and the dissenting jus-
tices cited a number of cases in
which lower courts found no
invocations under Davis even
though suspects used fairly
plain language.  The dissenters
asserted that the decision
dilutes the prosecution’s burden of proof of waiver “to the bare
fact that a suspect made inculpatory statements after Miranda
warnings were given and understood.”35
In my view, Berghuis v. Thompkins is the Court’s most signifi-
cant Miranda ruling since Dickerson v. United States36 was
announced a decade ago.  Thompkins has enormous practical
implications for policing.  While many law-enforcement agen-
cies have already trained police about implied waivers and many
courts have upheld them, this case finds an implied waiver on
an extreme set of facts:  hours of nonstop questioning using a
full range of interrogation tactics on a virtually non-responsive
suspect.  In the wake of this case, we may expect to see more
agencies training officers on implied waivers and advising that
they may safely forgo seeking express waivers, even when a sus-
pect does not initially respond to the officers’ questions.
It is also worth noting what was not important to the Court
in Thompkins.  The majority did not discuss the effect of the offi-
cers’ interrogation tactics on Thompkins or his waiver—even
though the underlying premise of Miranda is that these tactics
create inherently compelling pressures—and Thompkins’s
waiver was in the midst of the interrogation.  The Court simply
assumed that Thompkins made a unconstrained choice to speak
after almost 3 hours of questioning.37 Perhaps this was because
the majority conceived that “Miranda’s main protection lies in
advising defendants of their rights.”38 Nor was the quality of the
record a concern to the justices.  The officers did not tape the
interrogation, though recording equipment was available to
them, and they did not take contemporaneous notes.  Thus, the
officers could remember very little about what was said during
the interrogation until Thompkins gave his incriminating
answers.
Finally, Thompkins leads to an important question:  will an
implied Miranda waiver also waive a suspect’s Sixth Amendment
rights?  One of the big cases of the 2008-2009 Term was Montejo
v. Louisiana,39 which overruled Michigan v. Jackson40 and held
that officers may approach and interrogate a suspect after his
Sixth Amendment rights have attached.  In Patterson v. Illinois,41
the Court found that Miranda warnings are sufficient to convey
the gist of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Patterson’s
express Miranda waiver also effectively waived his Sixth
Amendment rights.  But will an implied Miranda waiver also suf-
fice?  There may be reasons to find it does not—for example, if
Miranda’s main protection is the advice of rights, the Sixth
Amendment protects something altogether different and might
deserve more stringent waiver rules—but the question remains
open and courts may be beginning to address it.42
SIXTH AMENDMENT
There were a number of important Sixth Amendment deci-
sions this past Term, including rulings relating to various aspects
of the rights to a jury trial, to counsel, and to be free from dou-
ble jeopardy.  One of the most significant developments was
Padilla v. Kentucky,43 which established that defense counsel
must in many circumstances also advise a client of the immigra-
tion consequences of a conviction.
Effective Assistance of Counsel & Immigration
Consequences
Padilla was a lawful permanent resident of the United States
for more than 40 years, and a Vietnam War veteran.  After plead-
ing guilty to transportation of a large amount of marijuana, he
faced deportation to Honduras.  Padilla sought to set aside his
guilty plea, alleging that his lawyer not only failed to tell him of
the immigration consequences of his plea but affirmatively mis-
led him, saying that he “did not have to worry about immigra-
tion status” since he had been in the country for so long.44 The
state court denied his post-conviction petition, determining that
deportation (now called “removal”) is a collateral consequence
of a conviction and thus that counsel’s erroneous advice could
not provide a basis for relief.  The Supreme Court reversed 7-2.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens rejected the state
court’s distinction between direct and collateral consequences,
saying that that distinction has never been applied to define the
scope of constitutionally adequate representation under
Strickland v.  Washington.45 Justice Stevens reviewed the history
of conviction-related deportations, and particularly the recent
trend toward eliminating any discretion to grant relief from
deportation.  In 1990, for example, Congress did away with judi-
cial recommendations against deportation, which formerly gave
sentencing judges an ability to make effectively binding recom-
mendations, and in 1996 Congress also eliminated the Attorney
General’s ability to grant discretionary relief from removal.
Currently, if a person has committed a removable offense, his or
her deportation is practically inevitable, though there are some
remnants of equitable discretion left with the Attorney General
for some types of offenses (though not for offenses relating to
drug trafficking).  With these changes in our immigration laws,
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said the majority, it is difficult to divorce the penalty of removal
from the conviction itself even though removal is a civil and not
a criminal sanction.
The Court ruled that where, as here, the deportation conse-
quences of a conviction are truly clear, there is a duty on the part
of defense counsel to advise of those consequences.  Justice
Stevens noted that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client
regarding the risk of deportation.”46 However, immigration law
can be complex and there will be many situations in which the
consequences of a particular plate are unclear or uncertain, and
there counsel’s duties are more limited.  “When the law is not
distinct and straightforward . . ., a criminal defense attorney
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending
criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration conse-
quences.”  The majority expressly rejected an argument urged by
the Solicitor General to limit the decision to circumstances
where counsel had affirmatively provided misadvice.  The Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine
whether Padilla could demonstrate prejudice. 
Concurring, Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts would
have accepted the limitation rejected by the majority and held
that an attorney may provide ineffective assistance by mislead-
ing a noncitizen client regarding the removal consequence of a
conviction.  However, they disagreed that an attorney has an
affirmative obligation to advise her client of the consequences of
a plea.  In their view, an attorney must simply refrain from
unreasonably providing incorrect advice, and counsel may tell
the defendant that a criminal conviction may have adverse
immigration consequences and that the client might consult
with an immigration attorney.  The concurrence also takes issue
with the majority’s position that counsel has different duties
depending upon whether the immigration consequences are
clear or whether the law is not “distinct and straightforward.”  It
will not always be easy to tell whether a particular provision is
consistent and clear.
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) dissented, arguing
that while in the best of all worlds defendants ought to be
advised of serious collateral consequences of conviction, “[t]he
Constitution . . . is not an all-purpose tool for judicial construc-
tion of a perfect world.”47 In their view, there is no textual sup-
port in the Sixth Amendment for a right to counsel to include
consequences that are collateral to prosecution.  Thus, the Sixth
Amendment provides no basis even for such a claim even when
counsel has affirmatively misadvised a defendant about the
immigration consequences of conviction.  Of course, such a
defendant may still assert, if he or she can, that a guilty plea was
not knowing and voluntary, which would be a claim under the
Due Process Clause.
This is an enormously important decision.  Whether or not it
opens the floodgates for future litigation (a claim discounted by
the majority), there is no doubt that the decision must lead pub-
lic defender offices and private defense practitioners to increase
their knowledge of immigration law and the immigration con-
sequences of criminal convic-
tions.  Courts may also play a
role here.  Justice Alito’s concur-
rence notes that there are rules,
plea forms, or statutes in 28
states and the District of
Columbia requiring courts to
advise criminal defendants of the
possible immigration conse-
quences of their guilty pleas.
Perhaps there is room to inquire
at change-of-plea hearings about
whether the defendant has con-
sulted with counsel about any
immigration consequences of a
conviction.  
Jury-Trial Rights
The Term saw important decisions on the Sixth Amendment
right to be tried by a jury drawn from sources that reflect a fair
cross-section of the community and on the effect of pretrial pub-
licity, as well as two summary reversals relating to jury selection
and the right to a public voir dire.
In Berghuis v. Smith,48 the fair-cross-section case, Diapolis
Smith was convicted of murder by an all-white jury in Kent
County, Michigan.  At the time of his trial, African-Americans
were 7.28% of the county’s jury-eligible population, and 6% of
the pool from which jurors could be drawn.  The Michigan
Supreme Court turned aside Smith’s Sixth Amendment chal-
lenge, but the U.S. Court of Appeals granted his federal habeas
corpus petition.  The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in a unani-
mous decision by Justice Ginsburg, with Justice Thomas con-
curring.
Under Duren v. Missouri,49 a defendant must satisfy a three-
prong test to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-
section requirement:  (1) the group alleged to have been
excluded must be distinctive in the community; (2) the repre-
sentation of this group in venires must not be fair and reason-
able in relation to the number of persons in the group in the
community; and (3) the underrepresentation must be due to the
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.50
The Court ruled that Smith could not prevail under the deferen-
tial standards applied in federal habeas corpus cases; the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
demands a showing that the state court’s decision involved an
unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court.”51
Smith could not show that the Michigan Supreme Court
unreasonably applied the Duren test because the U.S. Supreme
Court had not previously specified the method courts must use
to measure distinct groups in jury pools.  One possible test
would measure absolute disparity, meaning the difference
between the percentage of African-Americans in the local, jury-
eligible population (7.28%) and the percentage in the jury pool
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(6%); here the absolute dispar-
ity would be 1.28%.  Smith
argued that courts should
instead measure the comparative
disparity, which is the absolute
disparity (1.28%) divided by the
group’s representation in the
jury-eligible population
(7.28%); here that gives a figure
of 18%.  The Supreme Court
noted that each measure is
imperfect, and even without the
deferential habeas standards,
the Court would not specify
which method should be
used.52 In addition, the Court
ruled that Smith had not shown that underrepresentation was
due to systematic exclusion.  Smith claimed that the county’s
method of assigning jurors, sending potential jurors to local
courts first and making only the remaining jurors available for
the more serious cases, siphoned off African-American jurors.
But Smith failed to provide sufficient evidence that this method
or other possible factors caused the underrepresentation.  Justice
Thomas concurred, indicating that in an appropriate case he
would be willing to reconsider the precedents articulating the
fair-cross-section requirement.
The pretrial publicity case was Skilling v. United States,53
which arose from the Enron Corporation debacle.  (The decision
also contains an important holding about “honest services”
fraud, which is discussed later in this article).  Skilling was a
high-level executive at Enron, serving as CEO up until several
months before the company went into bankruptcy.  He was
charged in federal court in Houston with conspiracy to commit
honest-services wire fraud, among other charges.  Skilling
argued that venue should have been changed due to massive
publicity about Enron, and he asserted that he was denied his
Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury as well as his
due-process right to a fair trial.  The Fifth Circuit affirmed
Skilling’s conviction.  By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court agreed
and rejected these claims.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg first explained that
under the circumstances, the publicity did not give rise to a pre-
sumption of prejudice requiring a change in venue.  The prior
cases in which the Court had found a presumption of prejudice
from pretrial publicity were different.  In the foundational case,
Rideau v. Louisiana,54 tens of thousands of potential jurors in a
relatively small parish saw a televised confession by a defendant
in jail, flanked by the sheriff and state troopers.  In later cases,
extensive media coverage manifestly tainted the proceedings by
disrupting the trial or creating a carnival-like atmosphere.55
Here, by contrast, the trial took place in Houston, the fourth
largest city in the country, with a large and diverse pool of poten-
tial jurors.  The news coverage of Skilling and Enron did not
contain a dramatic event, such as a single confession, which
might be expected to leave an indelible imprint on jurors’ minds.
Additionally, over four years elapsed between Enron’s collapse
and the trial, and Skilling was acquitted of nine insider-trading
counts, which undermined a supposition of juror bias.
Next, the majority rejected Skilling’s claim of actual juror bias
and errors during voir dire.  Although the trial judge conducted
most of the voir dire, prospective jurors were required to com-
plete a comprehensive questionnaire, drafted in part by Skilling’s
attorneys, jurors were examined individually, and counsel were
permitted to ask supplemental questions.  Although Skilling
asserted that the trial judge should not have accepted jurors’
promises of fairness at face value, the judge did follow up indi-
vidually with jurors to uncover concealed bias.  The case was far
different than an earlier decision in which pretrial publicity con-
tained graphic details leading to a pattern of deep and bitter prej-
udice in the community that was also reflected in voir dire.56
Finally, the Court rejected arguments that several individual
jurors were biased, emphasizing that in reviewing such claims,
“the deference due to district courts is at its pinnacle,” and that
a finding of juror impartiality may can be overturned only for
“manifest error.”57 The trial judge made specific findings about
the credibility of specific jurors’ assertions of impartiality.  There
was no manifest error in seating these jurors.
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but wrote separately
to argue that there can be no violation of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of an impartial jury unless a biased juror is actually
seated at trial.  He would reject the argument that the Sixth
Amendment can be abridged simply by the denial of a motion
for change of venue due to adverse pretrial media coverage and
community hostility.58
Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer) dis-
sented.  They disputed the Court’s characterization of the pre-
trial publicity, finding that it was more voluminous and perva-
sive than reflected in the majority opinion.  They conceded that
the motion for a change of venue was properly denied (calling
the question “close”), largely because of the size of Houston and
the lack of a confession or smoking gun piece of evidence in the
media coverage.59 However, they would have reversed for an
inadequate voir dire, noting that the jury was selected in a
process that took only five hours.  Even under a deferential stan-
dard, in their view the trial judge gave short shrift to the moun-
tainous evidence of public hostility, failed to pursue important
lines of inquiry during voir dire, only rarely asked prospective
jurors to describe personal interactions about the case or
whether they could avoid discussing the case with others, and
addressed topics in a cursory fashion.  According to the dis-
senters, the judge also accepted on their face statements of
impartiality that appeared equivocal.
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The defendant in Thaler v. Haynes60 objected to a prosecutor’s
exercise of a peremptory challenge.  The judge, who had not
overseen the voir dire, found a prima facie case under Batson v.
Kentucky.61 The prosecutor offered an explanation for the chal-
lenge based on his observations of the juror’s demeanor, and the
judge found that the explanation was race neutral.  The defen-
dant, who was convicted, eventually brought a federal habeas
corpus petition.  The court of appeals found that the state court’s
ruling was an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law under AEDPA, as a trial judge who had not overseen
the voir dire could not adjudicate a demeanor-based challenge as
Batson requires.  The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition
for writ of certiorari and summarily reversed in a per curiam
decision.
The justices ruled that the state court’s decision was not con-
trary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent.  Batson
noted the need for a trial judge to take into account all of the
possible explanatory factors in assessing an offered reason for a
peremptory challenge.  Where the explanation is based on
demeanor, the judge “should take into account any observations
of the juror that the judge was able to make” during jury selec-
tion.62 But Batson “did not go further and hold that a demeanor-
based explanation must be rejected if the judge did not observe
or cannot recall the juror’s demeanor.”63 Nor did Snyder v.
Louisiana64 require that result.
Presley v. Georgia,65 another summary reversal, related to the
right to have members of the public attend voir dire.  The defen-
dant objected to the exclusion of a family member from the
courtroom during voir dire.  On appeal, the Georgia Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction and found that no abuse of dis-
cretion in excluding the family member, especially since the
defendant did not present the trial judge with any alternatives to
consider.
In a 7-2 per curiam decision, the Supreme Court summarily
reversed.  There are two lines of authority that provide the right
to a public trial, the First and Sixth Amendments.  The Court
had previously ruled that in the First Amendment context, the
right to a public trial in criminal cases includes the jury-selec-
tion phase and the voir dire of prospective jurors.66 While the
justices had previously held only that the Sixth Amendment
right to a public trial includes the actual proof at trial and pre-
trial suppression proceedings,67 the Presley Court found the
extension of the Sixth Amendment right to voir dire was so well-
settled that summary reversal was appropriate.  Further, “there
is no legitimate reason, at least in the context of juror selection
proceedings, to give one who asserts a First Amendment privi-
lege greater rights to insist on public proceedings than the
accused has.”68 The trial court was required to consider alter-
natives to closure even when alternatives are not offered by the
parties.  “Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable mea-
sure to accommodate public
attendance at criminal tri-
als.”69 While there are cir-
cumstances where a judge
might conclude that safety
concerns or threats of
improper communications
with jurors justify closing
voir dire, those circum-
stances must be articulated
along with specific findings.
Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissented, contending that the case should not have been
decided summarily.70
Double Jeopardy
The Court also issued a significant ruling on mistrials and the
Double Jeopardy Clause.  The defendant in Renico v. Lett71 was
tried for first-degree murder in a Michigan court.  The trial was
short—just nine hours—and the jury’s deliberations were even
shorter.  The jury sent out a note, asking what would happen if
jurors could not agree.  The judge asked the foreperson if the
jurors were going to reach a unanimous verdict, and he
responded “no.”  Without further inquiry or further findings,
the trial judge declared a mistrial.  Following a retrial, Lett was
convicted of second-degree murder.  He challenged his convic-
tion on the grounds that there was no manifest necessity for
declaring a mistrial and so his second trial should have been
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The Michigan Supreme
Court determined that the trial court had not abused its discre-
tion in granting the mistrial and affirmed.  However, the U.S.
District Court and Court of Appeals disagreed, and would have
granted Lett’s federal habeas corpus petition.  In a 6-3 decision
authored by the Chief Justice, the Supreme Court reversed.
The Court first described AEDPA’s deferential standard.  To
grant relief, a federal court must find an unreasonable applica-
tion of clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court.  The majority identified United States v. Perez72
as setting forth the “clearly established federal law.”  Perez pro-
vides that a trial judge may declare a mistrial whenever under all
of the circumstances there is a “manifest necessity” for doing so.
Prior authority also established that the decision to declare a
mistrial is afforded great deference by a reviewing court.  The
majority then pointed to other holdings in which the Court
declined to require a mechanical application of a formula to
decide whether a deadlock warranted a mistrial, and stating that
a trial judge is not required to make explicit findings of manifest
necessity nor articulate on the record the factors informing the
exercise of discretion.  Given these precedents, the Court held,
the state court’s decision was not unreasonable under AEDPA.
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The majority also faulted the
Court of Appeals for relying upon
its own precedents in determin-
ing that the state court’s ruling
was unreasonable.
Justice Stevens (joined by
Justices Sotomayor and Breyer)
dissented.  He took issue with the
majority’s characterization of the
facts.  The jury deliberated only
40 minutes the first day and only
a few hours on the second.  The
jury’s note only asked what
would happen if the jury could
not agree; it did not indicate that
the jury was already deadlocked.
The judge also cut off the
foreperson after asking whether the jury was hopelessly dead-
locked.  The entire exchange with the foreperson took only three
minutes and the jury only deliberated for four hours.  In addi-
tion to this haste, the judge did not poll jurors, give an instruc-
tion for further deliberations, ask defense counsel for input, or
indicate on the record why a mistrial was necessary.  Under these
circumstances, the state court’s conclusion was unreasonable.73
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Term saw a very important Eighth Amendment ruling,
Graham v. Florida,74 a challenge to juvenile life-without-parole
sentences.  The Court also handed down several decisions about
defense counsel’s duties in the penalty phase of a capital case,
including an unusual number of summary reversals.
Juveniles and Life Without Parole
Graham asked whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited
juveniles from receiving life-without-parole sentences in non-
homicide prosecutions.  Graham was 16 when pled guilty to
attempted burglary with assault or battery in a Florida court.
Adjudication was originally withheld, and he was placed upon
probation.  Graham was later charged with violating probation
by participating in a home-invasion robbery and other charges,
and he was resentenced on the original offense.  Though the
prosecutor argued for a determinate sentence and the presen-
tence report urged a sentence of no more than four years, the
trial court imposed a life-without-parole sentence, telling
Graham that “the only thing I can do now is to try and protect
the community from your actions.”75 The sentence was upheld
by the intermediate state appellate court, and the Florida
Supreme Court denied review.  The U.S. Supreme Court vacated
the sentence in a 6-3 ruling.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that the
Court’s Eighth Amendment proportionality decisions have typi-
cally fallen into one of two classifications.  One is challenges to
the length of life or term-of-years sentences imposed in particu-
lar cases, such as in Harmelin v. Michigan76 (rejecting a propor-
tionality challenge to a life-without-parole sentence for cocaine
possession) and Ewing v. California77 (rejecting a challenge to a
25-years-to-life sentence for theft of golf clubs).  The other type
comprises categorical restrictions on the imposition of the death
penalty.  These may be restrictions related to the nature of the
offender, as in Roper v. Simmons78 (no death penalty for com-
mission of an offense by someone under the age of 18) and
Atkins v. Virginia79 (no death penalty for persons with low intel-
lectual functioning), or they may relate to the nature of the
offense, as in Kennedy v. Louisiana80 (no death penalty for non-
homicidal child rape) and Coker v. Georgia81 (no death penalty
for adult rape). In Graham, the Court decided for the first time
to take a categorical approach to a non-capital sentence.  As the
majority held, the case-by-case proportionality approach “is
suited for considering a gross proportionality challenge to a par-
ticular defendant’s sentence, but here a sentencing practice itself
is in question. This case implicates a particular type of sentence
as it applies to an entire class of offenders who have committed
a range of crimes.”82
Taking this categorical approach, the Court then assessed
whether there was evidence of a national consensus against the
sentencing practice at issue in the case.  The majority noted that
37 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system per-
mit life-without-parole sentences for some non-homicide juve-
nile offenders and 6 states permit such sentences for juveniles in
homicide cases.  But “an examination of actual sentencing prac-
tices in jurisdictions where the sentence in question is permitted
by statute discloses a consensus against its use.  Although these
statutory schemes contain no explicit prohibition on sentences
of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, those
sentences are most infrequent.”83 Looking at evidence from a
study supplemented by the Court’s own research, the justices
located just 123 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving life
without parole, 77 of whom were in Florida and the remaining
46 spread among 10 states.
In addition to this consensus against juvenile life-without-
parole sentences in non-homicide cases, the majority found that
“none of the goals of penal sanctions that have been recognized
as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and reha-
bilitation—provides an adequate justification”84 for a life-with-
out-parole sentence.  Among other reasons, juveniles are not as
culpable as adults, they are less susceptible to deterrence, and
they will serve longer in prison than similarly situated adults
(because the sentences are
imposed on them at earlier
ages).  In sum, while “[a]
State is not required to guar-
antee eventual freedom to a
juvenile offender convicted of
a nonhomicide crime . . .,
[w]hat the State must do . . . is
give defendants like Graham
some meaningful opportunity
to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.”85 Of course, it
is still possible that juveniles
who commit non-homicide
offenses will be incarcerated
for the rest of their lives.  But the Eighth Amendment “forbid[s]
States from making the judgment at the outset that those offend-
ers never will be fit to reenter society.”86
Chief Justice Roberts concurred.  He would have applied the
narrower proportionality framework that focuses on the specific
facts of a case, the offender, and the sentence.  Based on these
facts and circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts would infer that
Graham’s sentence was grossly disproportionate, an inference
confirmed by intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional compar-
isons of the sentence.87 But citing other cases with substantially
more gruesome facts, the Chief Justice calls the majority’s cate-
gorical decision “as unnecessary as it is unwise.”88
Justices Thomas (joined by Justice Scalia and, in part, by
Justice Alito) dissented.  Justice Thomas restated an argument
he has put forth before—that the Eighth Amendment applies to
the method of punishment, and contains no proportionality
principle—and also criticized the majority for eviscerating a dis-
tinction in  approaches in capital and non-capital cases.  He then
argued that the majority erred in looking beyond the language of
the states’ statutes to find a national consensus against life-with-
out-parole sentences for non-homicide juvenile offenders.  If
one looks at the “overwhelming legislative evidence . . . [n]ot
only is there no consensus against this penalty, there is a clear
legislative consensus in favor of its availability.”89 Justice
Thomas also disagreed with the majority’s analysis of whether
juvenile life-without-parole sentences further the purposes of
punishment, and he would not have struck down Graham’s sen-
tence even under the Chief Justice’s narrower approach.  Justice
Alito additionally dissented and pointed out briefly that a sen-
tence of a term of years, such as 40 years, would likely not be
unconstitutional.90
Graham is significant in several respects.  It applied a cate-
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gorical approach to a non-capi-
tal case and it made a functional
assessment of whether there
was a national consensus
against these sentences.  It
remains to be seen whether
these two aspects of Graham
will be influential. 
Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel and Capital
Sentencing
An argued case, Wood v.
Allen,91 addressed whether a state court’s denial of a post-con-
viction petition should be upheld under the deferential standard
set forth under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d)(2).  An inexperienced
lawyer represented the defendant in the penalty phase of his cap-
ital case.  While the lawyer read a mental-health expert’s report
prepared for the guilt phase, he was told by a senior cocounsel
that nothing in the report merited further investigation.  At a
post-conviction hearing in state court, the senior lawyer testified
that evidence of the defendant’s mental-health problems would
have been presented at the penalty phase if he had been aware of
it, and the junior lawyer in charge of the penalty phase testified
that he did not recall considering the defendant’s mental defi-
ciencies.  
In an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court concluded that
“the state court’s finding that Wood’s counsel made a strategic
decision not to pursue or present evidence of Wood’s mental
deficiencies was not an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceed-
ings.”92 Much of the evidence, the justices found, speaks “not to
whether counsel made a strategic decision, but rather to
whether counsel’s judgment was reasonable—a question we do
not reach.”93 The Court also declined to reach a question on
which it granted review, whether 28 U.S.C. section 2254(e)(1)
also requires proof by clear and convincing evidence to over-
come a presumption that a state court’s finding of fact was cor-
rect.  Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented.  He
wrote that “the only reasonable factual conclusion” is that coun-
sel’s decision “to forgo investigating powerful mitigating evi-
dence of Wood’s mental deficits” was due to inattention and
neglect, “the antithesis of a ‘strategic’ choice.”94
Through a series of summary reversals, the Supreme Court
sought to provide greater guidance to courts, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys about effective assistance of counsel in capital-
sentencing proceedings.  
In Bobby v. Van Hook,95 the Court granted certiorari and sum-
marily reversed the Sixth Circuit, which had granted habeas cor-
pus relief.  In a per curiam decision, the justices held that the
federal court of appeals erred by measuring counsel’s perfor-
mance by American Bar Association standards issued years after
the trial, and emphasized that the standards are only guides as to
what reasonably diligent attorneys should do.96 Moreover,
counsel’s mitigation investigation was not unreasonably limited,
nor was the defendant prejudiced by any failure to dig deeper.  
In Wong v. Belmontes,97 another per curiam summary reversal,
the Court found that the trial lawyer’s alleged failure to present
additional mitigating evidence at the penalty phase did not prej-
udice the defendant in light of the facts of the crime and the mit-
igating evidence that was adduced for the jury. The defense
lawyer had refrained from presenting certain mitigating evi-
dence in an effort to prevent the prosecution from introducing
powerful evidence of an additional homicide.  The Court did not
determine whether the lawyer’s work had been deficient
because—even assuming it was—the Court found no prejudice. 
We can contrast these cases (and particularly Wong) with the
summary reversals in Sears v. Upton98 and Porter v. McCollum.99
The petitioner in Sears was sentenced to death following a mit-
igation investigation that a state post-conviction court found to
be inadequate.  At the penalty phase, defense counsel relied
upon a theory, which backfired, that portrayed the defendant as
coming from a stable and loving household.  The truth, which
trial counsel never discovered, was quite to the contrary and it
also turned out that the defendant was low-functioning due to
brain damage and drug and alcohol abuse.  The Supreme Court
summarily reversed and remanded for the state court to make a
proper determination of prejudice.  Although the state court
found that the trial lawyer presented some mitigation evidence,
that does not foreclose an inquiry into whether counsel’s failure
to discover the additional evidence prejudiced the defendant.100
Likewise, in Porter, trial counsel had only one short meeting
with the defendant about the penalty phase, did not obtain
school medical or military records, and did not interview wit-
nesses.  This fell short of professional standards just as in an ear-
lier case, Wiggins v. Smith.101 Contrary to the view of the Florida
Supreme Court, counsel’s failures undermined confidence in the
outcome of the case, particularly in light of the moving evidence
(which was not presented) of the defendant’s combat experi-
ences, childhood history, and limitations.
FIRST AMENDMENT 
The Court struck down a federal criminal statute and over-
turned a conviction on First Amendment grounds.  The defen-
dant in United States v. Stevens102 was convicted of violating 18
U.S.C. section 48, which criminalizes the commercial creation,
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sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty in interstate or
foreign commerce.  The legislation was aimed at the market for
“crush videos,” though the videos involved in this case were of
dogfighting (which is still outlawed throughout the United
States).  
In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the justices first
declined to hold that depictions of animal cruelty are categori-
cally unprotected by the First Amendment.  Though it noted
some historic and traditional categories of unprotected speech—
such as defamation, fraud, and speech integral to criminal con-
duct—the Court rejected the government’s suggestion that
speech may be deemed categorically unprotected depending
upon a balance of the value of the speech and societal costs.  The
Court then determined that section 48 was facially invalid
because it was overbroad; the statute does not require that the
depicted conduct be cruel.  The justices also turned aside efforts
to narrow the construction, such as by implying exceptions that
would exempt from the prohibition depictions with certain reli-
gious, political, scientific, or other values.  Finally, the Court was
unconvinced by the government’s assurances that it would only
prosecute for acts of extreme cruelty.  Justice Alito was the sole
dissenter.  He would have remanded to decide whether the
videos were constitutionally protected but, in any event, would
not have found the statute to be overbroad.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
As usual, the Supreme Court decided a number of federal
criminal cases last Term.  While most may be of interest primar-
ily to federal judges and practitioners, the “honest-services”
fraud rulings may spark larger debates about what kinds of acts
should be considered fraudulent.
The main honest-services fraud decision is Skilling v. United
States.103 (The venue and jury selection issues in Skilling are dis-
cussed earlier in this article.)  Skilling was convicted for con-
spiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud, among other
counts.  The federal mail- and wire-fraud statutes criminalize
using the mails or wires in furtherance of “any scheme or arti-
fice to defraud” as well as obtaining money by false or fraudu-
lent pretenses, representations, or promises.104 A number of
lower federal courts had interpreted these fraud statutes to per-
mit conviction for the deprivation of intangible rights, without
any financial loss to an individual or the public.  In McNally v.
United States,105 the Court limited the scope of these fraud
statutes in a case where a public official received kickbacks for
giving state business to an insurance agent but where there was
no allegation that the kickbacks led to higher premiums or
worse insurance for the state.  Congress responded by enacting
a new statute, 18 U.S.C. section 1346, that defined a “scheme or
artifice to defraud” to include “any scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services.”  This was the
statute challenged in Skilling.  The justices unanimously
reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding Skilling’s con-
viction for conspiracy to commit honest-services wire fraud,
though they split on whether section 1346 could be given a lim-
iting construction.
Writing for six members of the Court, Justice Ginsburg first
addressed the argument that section 1346 should be struck
down as unconstitutionally vague.  Although the statute was
meant to reinstate the body of pre-McNally honest-services law
and that law was in disarray, the vast majority of the pre-McNally
honest-services cases involved offenders who participated in
bribery or kickback schemes in violation of a fiduciary duty.
While a broad reading of the statue would raise vagueness and
due-process concerns, “there is no doubt that Congress intended
[the statute] to reach at least bribes and kickbacks.”106 Instead
of invalidating the statute in its entirety, the majority gave it a
limiting construction.  When limited to bribery and kickback
schemes, section 1346 is not unconstitutionally vague.  The
majority vacated the court of appeals’ affirmance, and remanded
to determine if the conspiracy conviction could be upheld on a
different theory (as honest-services fraud was only one of three
alleged objects of the conspiracy), and to assess whether a rever-
sal on the conspiracy count would affect any of the other counts
of conviction.
Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy) con-
curred in the judgment, but would have struck down section
1346 as vague without providing a limiting construction.  In
their view, the majority’s efforts to pare down the statute were
beyond judicial power.  They contended that no court before
McNally construed the deprivation of honest-services in such a
limited way and that the majority was essentially rewriting the
statute.  These justices would simply have reversed Skilling’s
conspiracy conviction on the grounds that section 1346 “pro-
vides no ‘ascertainable standard’ for the conduct it con-
demns.”107
Following the decision in Skilling, the Court vacated the
court of appeals’ rulings in two other honest-services fraud cases
(Black v. United States108 and Weyhrauch v. United States109) and
remanded for further proceedings.  In Black, the Court addi-
tionally determined that the defendant had not forfeited his
objection to honest-services fraud instructions when he objected
to the prosecution’s request for special verdicts; the special ver-
dicts might have revealed whether the jury convicted on a the-
ory of honest-services fraud.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
Two decisions on aspects of federal habeas corpus may be of
broad interest.
A federal habeas corpus court will not review a claim rejected
by a state court if the decision of the state court rests on a state-
law ground that is independent of the federal question and ade-
quate to support the judgment.  The issue in Beard v. Kindler110
was whether a state procedural rule is automatically inadequate
under this doctrine if the rule is discretionary and not manda-
103. 130 S.Ct. 2896 (2010).
104. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. 
105. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
106. Id. at 2931.
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States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921)).
108. 130 S.Ct. 2963 (2010).
109. 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010).
110. 130 S.Ct. 612 (2009).
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112. 130 S.Ct. 2788 (2010).
113. Id. at 2796.
114. Id. at 2797.
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concurred to point out that the decision also fits comfort-
ably with Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007).
116. Schwarzenegger v. Plata, No. 09-1233.
117. Connick v. Thompson, No. 09-571.
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119. See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S Ct 1710 (2009).  Compare State
v. Karson, 235 P.3d 1260 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (applying
good faith exception) with People v. McCarty, 229 P.3d
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120. Kentucky v. King, No. 09-1272.
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tory.  Joseph Kindler was convicted of capital murder in
Pennsylvania.  He escaped from custody before his post-verdict
motions could be heard and before he could be sentenced.
Kindler was returned to Pennsylvania about seven years later.  In
the meanwhile, his motions were dismissed under a state rule
that permits (but does not require) a court to find a claim to be
forfeited when a defendant has become a fugitive.  When the
case got federal court, both the district court and the court of
appeals determined that the fugitive-forfeiture rule did not pro-
vide an adequate basis to bar federal review.  The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed.  
In a decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
held that “a discretionary rule can be ‘firmly established’ and
‘regularly followed’—even if the appropriate exercise of discre-
tion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases
but not others.”111 The justices noted that a contrary holding
might have the perverse effect of encouraging states to adopt
mandatory rules rather than permit discretion to be exercised in
appropriate cases. 
The question in Magwood v. Patterson112 was whether a fed-
eral habeas corpus petition was “second or successive” under
AEDPA.  The defendant was convicted and sentenced to death.
In a prior federal habeas corpus petition, he succeeded in over-
turning his sentence, though he was re-sentenced to death fol-
lowing a new penalty hearing.  The state courts affirmed his new
sentence and he brought another federal habeas corpus petition.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that
some of Magwood’s claims could have been brought in the first
petition and, thus, those claims should be governed by 28 U.S.C.
section 2244(b), which restricts “second or successive” habeas
applications.  A closely divided Supreme Court reversed.  
In an opinion for the Court written by Justice Thomas, the
majority found that the AEDPA provision applies “only to a ‘sec-
ond or successive’ application challenging the same state-court
judgment.”113 In previous decisions, the Court had made clear
that the phrase does not apply to all petitions filed later in time;
for example, some issues such as competency to be executed
may not be ripe until some time after the first petition has been
filed.  The majority was persuaded that a habeas corpus applica-
tion challenges a judgment of confinement and “the phrase ‘sec-
ond or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judg-
ment challenged.”114 This interpretation would also be most
consistent with other parts of AEDPA, including the exceptions
to dismissal for successive petitions.115 Justice Kennedy (joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg and Alito) dis-
sented.  They would read the language of the statute differently
and would incorporate pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrine.
Under their reading of the statute, a second-in-time application
would be barred as successive if it sought to raise a claim that
the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to raise previously,
and a “mixed” petition would be treated as “second or succes-
sive.”  The dissenters were particularly concerned that the
majority’s construction of the statute would encourage abuse of
the writ when a petitioner has succeeded on even the most
minor and discrete issue relating to his sentencing.
A LOOK AHEAD
An early look at the October 2010 Term reveals some notable
cases though, as of this writing, perhaps none to rival the block-
busters of this past year.  
Two civil-rights cases present important questions.  One is a
challenge to a three-judge panel’s order to reduce prison over-
crowding in California.116 Another asks whether a prosecutor’s
office can be liable for failure to train prosecutors about their
Brady obligations.117
The Fourth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause are back on the menu.  The Court is slated
to decide if evidence is excluded under the Fourth Amendment
when officers act in good-faith reliance on a judicial decision
that is later overturned;118 the question has vexed courts since
the justices decided Arizona v. Gant and revised the principles of
automobile searches incident to arrest.119 Another Fourth
Amendment case asks whether officers can—through their own
conduct—create an exigency that may excuse them from obtain-
ing a warrant.120 Two Confrontation Clause cases posit whether
statements by a wounded crime victim are testimonial121 and
whether the report of one lab analyst may be introduced through
the testimony of a supervisor or other analyst.122 And the Court
will return once more to Miranda, addressing whether courts
should consider a juvenile’s age in deciding if he is in custody for
Miranda purposes.123
There are certain to be significant rulings and some surprises.
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There is a surge in the debate in the U.S. over the methodsof judicial selection and retention, with some rallying formerit-selection plans, others continuing to support judi-
cial elections, and virtually no one proposing lifetime appoint-
ments. The impetus for this surge may be related to three
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases, Republican Party of Minnesota
v. White,1 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,2 and
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,3 and to the exploding amount
of campaign funds raised in judicial elections. These factors
seem to have once again brought to the forefront the judicial
election method and consequently revitalized the merit
method, which had been dormant for three decades. Whether
this boost in the debate is tantamount to a new movement, a
continuation of an old movement, a blip on the radar screen, a
wave, or a full-fledged tsunami, remains to be seen. But one
thing is clear:  since the United States’ inception, there have
been periodic movements to change the method of selecting
and retaining judges, and the methods have often been com-
plex and convoluted.
There were essentially three major movements in the U.S.,4
which I will refer to as the “Original Lifetime Appointment
Movement,” the “Jackson Democracy Movement,” and the
“Progressive Reform Movement.” Not unlike the present
debate, political, legal, social, and cultural factors have all
served as the catalysts for these movements. Although there
have been some slight variations, these movements essentially
involve four different selection methods:  lifetime appoint-
ment, partisan election, nonpartisan election, and merit selec-
tion and retention. These movements have been in a constant
state of flux, with many states using constitutional amend-
ments, legislative acts, ballot initiatives, and executive orders
to both move in and out of the methods, and to make modifi-
cations short of complete overhauls. For example, 9 of 16
states that initially only used the appointment method
switched to judicial elections for some level of their judiciary,5
14 states changed from partisan to nonpartisan elections,6 and
15 states have changed from partisan or nonpartisan elections
to some form of the merit method.7 When all is said and done,
over the last 234 years, this activity has resulted in 39 states
deviating substantially from their initial selection method.
Notwithstanding these major changes, there have been far
more slight modifications and failed attempts, than an actual
change in judicial-selection methods. There were approxi-
mately 358 method modifications, including but not limited
to, the creation of commissions, change in term lengths and
periods, change in the mandatory retirement age, and change
in the appointing authority.8 Additionally, there have been
approximately 66 failed attempts to change methods.9
With the exception of some novel intermittent arguments,
the debate over which method is best has remained funda-
mentally the same. While the parties taking up the various
causes have changed over time, including former U.S. Supreme
82 Court Review - Volume 46 
The Debate over the Selection
and Retention of Judges:
How Judges Can Ride the Wave
Mary A. Celeste
AN AMERICAN JUDGES ASSOCIATION WHITE PAPER
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,10 judges remain at the
center of the debate. Within a historical context, this Paper
will identify and discuss these movements and methods along
with their catalysts. It will also set forth a snapshot of the
methods currently used in each state, as well as state proposals
and measures that could potentially affect these methods. In
light of the recent Supreme Court cases, the Paper will discuss
the impact that these methods may have on a judge’s conduct.
Finally the Paper will specify and restate the arguments both
supporting and criticizing these methods and will review the
various proposals for stopgap measures.  The goal of this Paper
is to identify some of the new challenges and pitfalls for judges
operating within every method of retention and selection given
the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, and to educate
judges about how these methods of selection and retention ebb
and flow over time. Armed with this knowledge, and an under-
standing that change requires respect for the cultural differ-
ences of each method, judges should be able to take a leader-
ship role in the debate. 
I. MOVEMENTS AND METHODS
A. The Original Lifetime Appointment Movement
The first movement was very much influenced by the United
States’ independence from England. In the American colonies,
the “king had absolute control over the appointment and
removal of Judges.”11 Because the founders were concerned
about how judges in England were controlled by the king,12 they
established in the Constitution lifetime appointments for all fed-
eral judges based on the advice and consent of the Senate.13 The
U.S. Constitution was modeled after the Massachusetts State
constitution, which was drafted by John Adams.14 Adams wrote
that judges “should not be dependent upon any man or body of
men. To these ends, they should hold estates for life in their
offices; or, in other words, their commissions should be during
good behavior . . . .”15 The original states followed suit with life-
time appointments,16 but the method of appointment varied, as
“seven states selected their judges by the legislature and five
states had the governor appoint judges who would then be
approved by a special council
appointed by the legisla-
tures.”17 Another proponent of
this movement was Alexander
Hamilton, who believed that if
a judge engaged in judicial
elections, it would affect judi-
cial independence and hence
the judiciary itself.18 The life-
time appointment method is
still used today for federal
judges, U.S. Supreme Court
Justices, and the state of Rhode
Island.19 Massachusetts and
New Hampshire both have
unlimited judicial terms, but
set a mandatory retirement age
at seventy.20
B. The Jackson Democracy Movement 
The appointment method came under attack during the
presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829–1837) when the senti-
ment of the country was that “governmental office holders
should be accountable to the voters and, therefore, elected.”21
This movement ultimately became the largest of the three, as
the decades following Jackson’s presidency saw 21 of 30 states
adopt the popular election method.22 Like many other political
movements, this movement was at first considered radical, a
measure “intended to break judicial power through an infusion
of popular will and majority control.”23 These “radicals”
believed that popular election would remove the selection of
judges from party leaders.24 Scholars have attributed this move
from judicial appointments to judicial elections to several fac-
tors, including “the belief that judges at the local level should
be more responsive to their communities,”25 that electing
judges was considered democratic,26 and that judicial appoint-
ments were being meted out as political patronage.27
This movement began in the early 1800s and continued
through the civil war to the annexation of Alaska in 1959.28
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40. Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne, Partisan Judicial Elections:
Lessons From a Bellwether State, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1357,
1359 (2003); see also RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 10.
41. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 9; see also Stephen P. Croley,
The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 716 (1995).
42. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Tennessee, and Utah. DEBORAH KILEY,
MERIT SELECTION OF CALIFORNIA JUDGES 9 (Mar. 2, 1999),
http://www.mcgeorge.edu/documents/centers/government/ccglp_
pubs_merit_selection_pdf.pdf.
43. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and New York. Id. at 8–9.
44. Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers Pick: Finding a Set of Best
Practices for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 163, 169–70 (2007).
45. The Missouri Bar, From the Report by the Commission on Judicial
Independence, History of Merit Selection, http://www.mobar.org/
81a9785d-c049-411d-bdd5-816ffe26a2a6.aspx (last visited Nov.
30, 2010).
The first wave was between
1846 and 1860 when state con-
stitutions were rolled out across
the U.S.29 The debate between
appointment and judicial elec-
tions played out at the constitu-
tional conventions with some
states giving the debate more
attention than others.30 One
scholar attributes this move-
ment to a desire for greater judi-
cial independence: 
In addition to direct limits
on legislative power, most of these conventions adopted
judicial elections. Many delegates stated that their pur-
pose was to strengthen the separation of powers and
empower courts to use judicial review. The reformers
got results: elected judges in the 1850s struck down
many more state laws than their appointed predeces-
sors had in any other decade. These elected judges
played a role in the shift from active state involvement
in economic growth to laissez-faire constitutionalism.31
The reform focused on the appellate and inferior courts,32
with the states of Vermont, Indiana, and Georgia as the first
three states permitting local governments the option to elect
trial court judges.33 This trend was followed by Mississippi in
1832 and New York in 1846.34 By 1850, 7 more states also per-
mitted elections and by the time of the Civil War, 24 states had
an elected judiciary.35
At the turn of the century there was a new round of debates
between the appointment method and the election method
proponents.  Roscoe Pound,36 noted legal scholar, in a well
known speech before the ABA in 1906, stated that “putting
courts into politics, and compelling judges to become politi-
cians in many jurisdictions has almost destroyed the tradi-
tional respect for the bench.”37 As a result, there was another
reform of sorts with the creation of nonpartisan elections in an
attempt to remove national partisan interests from state and
local elections and to clean up the patronage and cronyism.38
In 1927, 12 states employed nonpartisan elections,39 and three
other states “had already tried and rejected nonpartisan elec-
tions.”40 By the end of the movement, every state that entered
the Union from 1846 to 1958 used either partisan or nonparti-
san elections to select some or all of their judges.41
C. The Progressive Reform Movement
The merit selection method was proposed for the purpose
of removing judges from the pressures of running for political
office. Merit-selection plans usually select judges through a
nominating commission with gubernatorial or legislative
appointment. After a specified term the judge stands for reten-
tion with no party affiliation or opponent and must receive a
certain vote percentage to be retained. Some states use perfor-
mance evaluations through commissions prior to the retention
election,42 while others use non-elective means of retention,
like reappointment.43 Although the merit selection and reten-
tion method, also known as the “Missouri Plan,” was devel-
oped in 1913 as a compromise that combined the best features
of appointment and election, it did not become a full-fledged
movement until the 1950s and 1960s.44 In 1914, it was the
American Judicature Society that first pushed for retention
elections through its new director Albert M. Kales, who offered
a nonpartisan court plan that featured the basic elements of
nomination, appointment, and elective-tenure.45 Later, in
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selection plan where a judicial commission provides a list of nom-
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Unsuccessful Reform Efforts, supra note 9.
50. Id.
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Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. See id.
56. Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New York,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See id.
57. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and West Virginia. See id. Ohio presents somewhat of a
hybrid situation by using partisan primary elections and nonpar-
tisan general elections. Id. Also, several states that use the election
method fill interim vacancies through a merit-selection process.
E.g., American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection:
New Mexico, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
methods/selection_of_Judges.cfm?state=NM (last visited Nov. 30,
2010).
58. Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. See American Judicature
Society, Methods of Judicial Selection:  Selection of Judges, supra
note 7.
59. Only Virginia and South Carolina are selected by the legislature.
Id. 
60. Hon. B. Michael Dann & Randall M. Hansen, Judicial Retention
Elections, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (“Judicial reten-
tion elections have been part of the selection and retention
process in many states for over thirty years. Twenty states use
some form of judicial retention election for appellate court judges
and justices, and twelve states use retention elections for at least
some of their trial court judges.”).
61. R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5.
62. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 23 (age 72); MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch.
III, art. I (age 70); N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73, 78 (age 70); OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 6 (age 70); see also Vermont Legislative Research
Shop, The University of Vermont, Mandatory Retirement Age of
Judges (Apr. 5, 2000), http://www.uvm.edu/~vlrs/doc/manda-
tory_retirement_age_of_judg.htm.
63. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, Washington. See Vermont Legislative
Research Shop, supra note 62.
64. California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.
1926, Harold Laski first suggested that judicial commissions
do the nominating.46
California adopted a version of this plan in 1934.47 Soon
thereafter Missouri adopted the most familiar version hence
called “the Missouri Plan.”48 It is interesting to note that
Louisiana, in 1921, may have been the first state to consider
the merit-selection method and has since rejected countless
proposals to adopt that method, as “at least one proposed con-
stitutional amendment calling for merit selection has been
introduced in all but one legislative session” since 1978.49
Similarly, Texas has rejected proposals to adopt the merit selec-
tion method numerous times, with ten rejections.50 Several fac-
tors, however, largely unrelated to judicial performance, con-
verged to halt the spread of the merit-selection method. These
factors included fractious constitutional conventions, a decline
in public confidence in both public and private institutions,
disenchantment with the merit method, and opposition to
change.51 By the mid-1980s, “these factors essentially halted
the trend to merit selection.”52
II. THE SNAPSHOT
A. Current State Judicial-Selection Methods
All four of the judicial-selection methods just discussed are
currently in use in various states. Sometimes states will even
use some combination of several methods.53 As a result,
appeals court judges, trial court judges, and county or munic-
ipal judges, may be selected or
retained using different meth-
ods within the same state.
Generally, 5 states use guberna-
torial or legislative merit
appointments without commis-
sions,54 14 states and the
District of Columbia use merit
selection through nominating
commissions,55 9 states use
merit selection combined with
other methods,56 8 states use a
partisan election system,57 and
14 states use a nonpartisan
election system.58 In the 19
states that either use merit
selection or appointments,
judges are usually appointed by either the governor or the leg-
islature,59 and then face either a retention election,60 or a reap-
pointment process by lawmakers.
While there is no mandatory retirement age for either U.S.
Supreme Court Justices or federal judges, with the exception of
one lifetime appointment state, Rhode Island,61 the remaining
states have a variety of mandatory retirement ages ranging from
70–75 years,62 or mandatory retirement with conditional provi-
sions,63 or no mandatory retirement age at all.64 In 1991, two
Missouri state court judges challenged the mandatory retire-
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Fla. 1990) (explaining that “a person does not surrender his con-
stitutional right to freedom of speech when he becomes a candi-
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CONDUCT AND ETHICS 11-14 to 11-15 (4th ed. 2007).
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ment provision in Missouri’s
Constitution, resulting in the
U.S. Supreme Court case
Gregory v. Ashcroft.65 The Court,
with Justice O’Connor writing
for the majority, held that (1)
appointed Missouri state judges
constitute appointees “on a poli-
cymaking level,” and were thus
excluded from protection under
the Federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and (2) the
Missouri Constitution’s manda-
tory retirement provision did not
violate the Equal Protection
Clause.66
B. The Catalysts for the Current Debate 
The current momentum for the debate may be attributed to
several factors. First, there has been a profusion of cases
brought by judges across the country regarding judicial cam-
paign activity, culminating in two U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions:  Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co.67 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court
recently decided Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,68 which may impact judicial campaign contribu-
tions. Lastly, the current debate may also be attributed to the
rising rate of judicial campaign contributions and polls indi-
cating public dissatisfaction with the judiciary as a whole. 
1. RECENT UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES
a. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
The question presented in White was whether the First
Amendment permitted the Minnesota Supreme Court to pro-
hibit candidates for judicial election “from announcing their
views on disputed legal and political issues.”69 The judge in
question, in the course of his nonpartisan campaign, “distrib-
uted literature criticizing several Minnesota Supreme Court
decisions on issues such as crime, welfare, and abortion.”70
Minnesota’s Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i),
featured an “announce clause,” restricting a candidate for judi-
cial office from announcing his or her views on disputed legal
issues.71 This Minnesota code provision was based on Canon
7(B) of the 1972 American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code
of Judicial Conduct.72 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that
the provision infringed on a judge’s right to free speech.73 As a
result of the White decision, elected judges, unlike appointed
and merit-selected judges, have brought a myriad of First
Amendment free speech challenges related to campaign activ-
ity, some finding success, while others did not.74 The White
decision also had implications outside the context of announce
clauses. For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of
North Dakota struck down a clause restricting judges from
making pledges or promises regarding certain legal issues, rely-
ing on White.75
But even in the years prior to White, judges were challenging
disciplinary actions and bringing lawsuits related to judicial
campaign activity with varying outcomes. These judges argued
First Amendment free speech violations mostly related to judi-
cial campaigns under the 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, preventing a judicial candidate from making
“pledges, promises, or commitments” with respect to cases,
controversies, or issues likely to come before the court.76 The
actions ranged from a successful challenge to Florida’s Canon
7B(1)(c), which prohibited discussion of “disputed legal or
political issues,”77 to an unsuccessful challenge to Kentucky’s
Canon 7B(1)(c), where the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
“there is a compelling state interest in so limiting a judicial can-
didate’s speech, because the making of campaign commitments
on issues likely to come before the Court tends to undermine
the fundamental fairness and impartiality of the legal system.”78
These two decisions dealt with similar issues but reached oppo-
site results. Several First Amendment challenges also arose out-
side of the context of commenting on legal issues likely to come
before the court. These challenges covered issues such as:  state-
ments relating to conduct in office,79 candidate question-
naires,80 and the accuracy of campaign statements.81 These
types of challenges also had varying outcomes. In the federal
arena, courts have tended to strike down restrictions on both
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campaign statements and a judge’s ability to respond to ques-
tionnaires, relying on First Amendment grounds.82
The repercussions from the White decision took several
forms:  states repealed their announce clauses,83 issued advi-
sory opinions,84 or declared that White did not affect their
codes;85 judicial ethics commissions dismissed proceedings
against judges;86 and judges commenced constitutional chal-
lenges.87 As evidenced by the extensive commentary regarding
White,88 the Supreme Court’s decision has done little to settle
what is and what is not protected judicial campaign speech.
Ethics advisory committees and disciplinary bodies continue
to enforce restrictions on judicial speech as long as the restric-
tions are narrowly tailored and differ from the restrictions
struck down in White.89 The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct (“2007 Code”) takes a similar approach.90 As a result
of White, the ABA added five comments to Rule 4.1 in the 2007
Code (paragraphs 11 through 15) that discuss the distinctions
between various “announce clauses.”91 Although the 2007
Code offers a better definition of acceptable campaign speech,
not all of the states have adopted the Code in toto.92 While the
White decision addressed a candidate’s political speech during
his or her own judicial campaign, it did not address free speech
regarding a judge’s personal involvement in political activities
outside of their own judicial campaign. Thus, it is quite possi-
ble that the White decision will spark a flurry of new cases.93
However, according to some scholars, the fear that the White
decision would result in “rancorous free-for-alls” has not been
realized.94
b. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
Another important U.S. Supreme Court case involving free
speech is Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.95
While the issue in White
related to judges’ freedom of
speech, the issue in Citizens
United related to the free
speech of a campaign sup-
porter in a presidential elec-
tion. In January 2008, appel-
lant Citizens United, a non-
profit corporation, released a
documentary critical of then-
Senator Hillary Clinton, a can-
didate for her party’s presiden-
tial nomination.96 Citizens United was poised to pay a cable
television company to carry the documentary through video-
on-demand during the 30 days prior to primary elections.97
There was a concern, however, that such action would violate
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), which prohibits
corporations from spending general treasury funds on “elec-
tioneering communications”—defined as “‘any broadcast,
cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refers to a clearly iden-
tified candidate for Federal office’ and is made within 30 days
of a primary or 60 days of a general election.”98 Thus, Citizens
United sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Federal Election Commission.99
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a controversial 5 to 4 decision,
overruled Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, holding that
the “Government may regulate corporate political speech
through disclaimer and disclosure requirements, but it may not
suppress that speech altogether.”100 The Court struck down the
portion of the BCRA that prohibited all corporations, both for-
profit and not-for-profit, and unions from broadcasting elec-
tioneering communications, and thus also overruled a portion
Citizens United
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105. Clear The Bench Colorado, http://www.clearthebenchcol-
orado.org/ (last visited Dec. 6, 2010). This group’s efforts failed,
as all three justices were retained. Post of Matt Masich to Law
Week Colorado, http://www.lawweekonline.com/2010/11/colo-
supreme-court-justices-retained/ (Nov. 3, 2010).
106. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States:
Nebraska, http://www.judicial selection.us/judicial_selection/
index.cfm?state=NE (last visited Dec. 6, 2010).
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Weeks Before Election, THE COLORADO INDEPENDENT, September
27, 2010.
108. Colo. Judicial Ethics Advisory Bd., Opinion 2010-03 (Sept. 29,
2010). These two judges were ousted. Pamela Dickman, Larimer
Judges’ Ouster Nearly Unprecedented: Public Campaign Against
Judicial Retention Rare, REPORTERHERALD.COM, Nov. 4, 2010,
http://www.reporterherald.com/news_story.asp?ID=30020.
109. A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over Decisions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/09/25/us/politics/25judges.html. All three Iowa Supreme
Court Justices were ousted. Jason Hancock, Iowa Ousts Three
Supreme Court Justices, Sets Stage for Push to Overturn Gay
Marriage, THE MINNESOTA INDEPENDENT, Nov. 3, 2010, available at
http://minnesotaindependent.com/73736/iowa-ousts-three-
supreme-court-justices-sets-stage-for-push-to-overturn-gay-
marriage.
110. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256–57,
2265 (2009).
111. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 77, at 11-58 to 11-59.
112. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. at 2265.
113. Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, Citizens United Called
Grave Threat For America’s Courts (Jan. 22, 2010)
http://www.justiceatstake.org/newsroom/press_releases.cfm/citi-
zens_united_called_grave_threat_for_americas_courts?show=ne
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of McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission, which upheld the
same provision.101 This holding
was based in part on the fact that
the BCRA’s prohibition on elec-
tioneering communications was
an “outright ban on speech,
backed by criminal sanctions.”102
It is comprehensible that
Citizens United may impact judi-
cial campaigns in election states
because corporate expenditures
are now unlimited. Although some scholars see Citizens United
as “another tool for condemning” judicial elections,103 this case
may also impact retention elections in merit-selection states. A
judge in an election state is cognizant of the need to raise funds
and run a campaign. In a retention election, however, the judge
may be totally unaware of the need to raise funds or campaign
until it is too late. Campaigning is not at the core of the merit
method as it is with the judicial-election method; in fact, that is
the principal distinguishing factor between the two. Typically, a
judge in a merit-selection state cannot even lodge a retention
campaign unless there is “active opposition.”104 One need not
even fashion a hypothetical scenario to make the point.
Currently in Colorado there is a somewhat active group of indi-
viduals called “Clear the Bench,” composed of a few state law-
makers and others who sought to vote out three Colorado
Supreme Court Justices based upon some of their more contro-
versial decisions.105 Unlike the organized 1996 campaigns of
Supreme Court Justice Lanphier and the group opposing him—
the first Supreme Court Justice in Nebraska history not to be
retained by the voters106—even at the latest stages of the elec-
tion cycle, other than some articles and editorials, there were no
known monetary expenditures by Clear the Bench in Colorado.
In a recent ruling, however, a state court required the group to
register as a political committee which means that they can only
accept donations under $525.00 per donor.107 None of the three
Colorado Supreme Court Justices up for retention engaged in
any campaign efforts. There was also a recent, successful effort
in Larimer County, Colorado to oust two state court judges for
their actions as former prosecutors, where the judges received
an advisory opinion allowing them to publicly respond to the
opposition.108 The most recent attempt to oust merit-selected
judges occurred in Iowa, where the National Organization for
Marriage spent $230,000 on television ads criticizing three state
supreme court justices for their ruling in a same sex marriage
case.109 Consider what would happen if a group seeking to oust
a merit-selected judge or justice received a large corporate
donation and waited until immediately prior to the retention
vote to usher in a tremendous statewide campaign? The judge
or justice will be ill-prepared, unfunded, and without an advi-
sory opinion permitting response; in other words, they will be
“sitting ducks.” In this sense, Citizens United may have an affect
on retention elections in merit-selection states.
c. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.
While Citizens United may indirectly impact all judicial
campaigns, Caperton will have a more direct effect. In
Caperton, the United States Supreme Court held that a justice’s
failure to recuse himself when a campaign contributor
appeared in his court violated the Due Process Clause of the
14th Amendment.110 Prior to this case, contributions by per-
sons or groups who represented a particular point of view, such
as opposition to abortion or to capital punishment, were not
precluded from making donations to judicial campaigns, but
there was always a concern that significant public attention
would lead to perceptions of favoritism.111 Caperton held that
such perceived favoritism might be so great as to require
mandatory judicial recusal based on constitutional con-
cerns.112 Although the circumstances in Caperton involved
judicial campaign contributions, this case has implications for
any type of perceived judicial favoritism.
In December 2009, “Michigan’s Supreme Court issued new
rules making it harder for justices to hear cases involving
major campaign supporters,”113 and “Wisconsin became the
third state to provide public financing for appellate court races,
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for judicial office will not”). But see Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr.,
“Announcement” By Federal Judicial Nominees, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1281, 1287 (2004) (asserting that the decision in White is
not limited to elected judges, and that it affords appointed judges
the same right to engage in political speech).
117. In re Enforcement of Rule 2.03, Canon 5.B(1)(c) (Mo. 2002) (en
banc).
118. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 1; see also DEBORAH
GOLDBERG ET AL., JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, THE NEW POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004 vii (June 2005), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsReport200
4_83BBFBD7C43A3.pdf. 
119. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 17, at 1.
120. GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 118, at 14–15.
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2010, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/judging-
dollars.
122. E.g., Amanda Terkel, Target Donates $150K To Group Supporting
Candidate Who Wants To Cut Waiters’ Minimum Wage, THINK
PROGRESS, July 27, 2010,
http://thinkprogress.org/2010/07/27/target-emmer-donate/.
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124. Id. at 11-40.
125. Id. 
so that judicial candidates would not have to seek money from
those appearing before them in court.”114 In contrast, the next
month, the Wisconsin Supreme Court was seeking to finalize a
proposed order that said judicial campaign contributions do
not require judges to step aside from hearing cases involving a
supporter.115
d. Collective Implications of White, Citizens United and
Caperton
When one begins to apply these three cases collectively to a
judicial campaign and election, things become convoluted.
Consider a scenario where a judge receives a campaign contri-
bution from an oil and gas corporation or an anti-abortion
nonprofit corporation by virtue of a cable advertisement for
the judge or against his opponent. Under Citizens United, in
those states without contribution limits, the corporation may
now expend an unlimited amount of advertising funds on
behalf of a judge. Additionally, that judge, under his exercise of
free speech rights as enunciated in White, may now openly
state his opposition to the use of alternative energy or abortion.
But one obstacle standing in the way of perceived or real judi-
cial partiality is Caperton. Under these circumstances a
Caperton argument would most likely result in the judge’s
recusal from the case. But what happens under the same sce-
nario when a different corporation with the exact same views
as the contributing corporation comes before the judge? While
the judge may recuse on the basis of a perceived partiality,
there is no mandate for him to do so under Caperton. There is
now a concern over the influence of politics in judicial elec-
tions as a result of of White, which permits judicial candidates
to discuss their positions on various legal issues while cam-
paigning, including issues that may come before them for deci-
sion.116 In response to White, the Missouri Supreme Court
repealed their announce clause, stating that “[r]ecusal, or
other remedial action, may nonetheless be required of any
judge in cases that involve an issue about which the judge has
announced his or her views as otherwise may be appropriate
under the Code of Judicial Conduct.”117
2. INCREASED EXPENDITURES
IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
Even before Citizens United,
private contributions to judicial
campaigns were beginning to
skyrocket and were playing a
major role in the success or
defeat of a judge running for a
seat on the bench:  “In the 2000,
2002 and 2004 election cycles,
candidates raised $123 million
compared with only $73.5 mil-
lion in the preceding three
cycles.”118 In a particularly
astounding example, a group in
West Virginia “raised at least $3.6
million to successfully beat an
incumbent.”119 Similarly, the
2004 contest between Lloyd
Karmeier and Gordon Maag, two
Illinois Supreme Court candi-
dates, raised almost $9.4 million, nearly double the previous
national record.120 That amount topped the money raised in 18
of 34 U.S. Senate races decided that year.121 One could foresee
these situations giving rise to backlash against a corporation for
funding a judicial candidate, not unlike those typical to political
campaigns. For example, in Minnesota, Target Corporation’s
donation to a group that supported the gubernatorial candidate
Tom Emmer has received harsh press from a variety of groups.122
Fortunately, there are some small restrictions in the judicial
campaign arena under both the 1990 and 2007 ABA Codes.
Judicial candidates may promote their campaigns through
advertisements under Canon 5C(1)(b)(ii) of the 1990 Code
and Rule 4.2(B)(2) of the 2007 Code, with some restrictions
related to the content.123 A judge engaged in judicial campaigns
may also accept contributions. The financing of a judicial cam-
paign is governed by Canon 5C(2) of the 1990 Code, which
requires a candidate to create campaign committees, and Rule
4.1(A)(8) of the 2007 Code, which does not.124 Who may be on
those committees and who may chair those committees varies
from state to state.125 There are also constraints on the solicita-
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tion of funds by those judicial
campaign committees, and these
too vary from state to state.126
Further, each state permits solici-
tation within various time lim-
its,127 as the 2007 Code also
leaves the solicitation time limits
to each state.128 The effectiveness
of these model codes, however, is
limited by the fact that not all of
the states have adopted all of the
code provisions.
3. PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION WITH THE JUDICIARY
Polling data that includes voters, business leaders, and
judges themselves demonstrates the concern over the potential
impact on the courts from special interest money. For example,
78% are very or somewhat concerned that judicial candidates
must, among other things, raise more money and 79% of busi-
ness leaders believe that contributions made to judicial cam-
paigns have some influence on judges’ decisions.129 Further,
more than 90% of the individuals polled believe that “judges
should not hear cases involving individuals or groups that con-
tributed to their campaign.”130 All of the public dissatisfaction
with the judiciary, however, is not based solely on the conduct
of judges in judicial elections. For example, even in merit-
selection states, where there are no campaigns or campaign
contributions, “the national trends in political trust of the judi-
ciary in the last two decades are found to be reflected in the
trends in the reported declines in the affirmative retention
vote.”131 The American Judges Association White Paper enti-
tled Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public
Dissatisfaction stated that “Americans are highly sensitive to
the processes of procedural fairness. It is no surprise, then, that
the perception of unfair or unequal treatment ‘is the single
most important source of popular dissatisfaction with the
American legal system.’’’132
III. THE DEBATE
As one scholar noted, “it is fairly certain that no single sub-
ject has consumed as many pages in law reviews and law-
related publications over the last 50 years as the subject of
judicial selection.”133 There has been a continuum of associa-
tions, organizations, and individuals involved in the debate, all
supporting various selection methods. In the past, these enti-
ties have included the League of Women Voters, Democracy
South, the Institute on Money in State Politics, and the
American Judicature Society—as the initiator of the merit
method and its ardent supporter. Today, the American
Judicature Society is still active in the debate, and is joined by
the Brennan Center, the ABA, the Justice at Stake Campaign, a
few state supreme court justices from around the country,134
and the Institute for Advancement of the American Legal
System, lead by Justice O’Connor. Although the Conference of
Chief Justices recognized the “hazards” of partisan judicial
elections,135 it ultimately labeled partisan elections a “reason-
able, constitutionally defensible method.”136 The National
Center for State Courts has remained neutral on the matter.137
Various academics and commentators are divided, with some
supporting judicial elections, allowing each constituent the
opportunity to exercise his or her democratic vote, while oth-
ers back a merit selection process, contending it insulates
judges from politics.
The basis for three of the major movements and methods
has lived on as part of the debate, as the proponents of judicial
elections continue to argue that elections hold judges account-
able to the public. The arguments, in their most basic terms,
break down to “judicial accountability” through the election
process, and “judicial independence” via merit-based selec-
tion.138 Electing judges is seen as consistent with our democ-
ratic ideals; allowing voters to decide maintains the indepen-
dence of the judicial branch by taking appointment influence
away from the other two branches.139 If the voters feel a par-
ticular judge is not doing his or her job properly, they can vote
the judge out at the next election or, in some states, request a
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Christie, the first Republican elected New Jersey governor since
1997, said he believes the panel has a history of “legislating from
the bench,” but declined to reference any specific decisions from
the justice who was not reappointed. Id. The governor said he
made the move to begin reshaping the seven-member court,
which was made up of four Democrats, two Republicans and an
Independent. Id.
recall election.140 Supporters of the election system maintain
that election allows for less partisanship than appointment.141
Selecting judges through elections, however, requires candi-
dates to campaign, ultimately involving speeches, debates, and
raising campaign funds, making judicial elections more like
legislative elections.142 Opponents of judicial elections note
that large donations from certain special interest groups or
even other lawyers can lower public confidence in the judi-
ciary and potentially improperly influence a judge’s impartial-
ity in his or her decisions.143 Elections are also viewed as part
of a political process, while judges are expected to be insulated
from politics. The basic idea behind elections—government by
the people—conflicts with the notion that judges are not sup-
posed to be influenced by the public’s will.144
On the other hand, supporters of merit-selection systems
emphasize how this model creates judicial independence.145
Merit-based appointments separate the judicial branch from
politics and other possible outside influences.146 Backers of
merit-based selection assert that the process ensures that the
most qualified and competent candidates are selected.147
Generally, candidates are evaluated by lawyers, rather than the
public, who are arguably better suited to assess a candidate’s
relevant qualifications.148 Many states that use merit selection
also have evaluation systems or retention elections in place to
assure accountability.149 Additionally, merit-selection propo-
nents purport that this mode of selection increases the num-
ber of minorities serving as judges and resolves the problem
of voter apathy.150 But Chris Bonneau, a noted expert in judi-
cial selection, suggests that voters are not apathetic, that they
do indeed turn out for compet-
itive judicial elections and that
they are able to distinguish
between candidates with prior
judicial experience and those
without prior judicial experi-
ence.151
Supporters of the merit
method also argue that judges
who must campaign will be
influenced by a campaign con-
tributor’s ideology. Some schol-
ars, however, believe that an
apolitical selection process is fiction and that judges are not
mere technocrats.152 In other words, they believe that the
merit process is still politicized.153 They maintain that the
merit method may lead to appointments that further the inter-
ests of the elected official’s political party since a politically
elected figure, whether it is the governor or legislator, ulti-
mately selects the judicial candidate.154 For example, New
Jersey’s Republican Governor Chris Christie recently decided
not to reappoint a Democrat to New Jersey’s highest court.155
Additionally, merit selection arguably erodes judicial account-
ability, making the appointed judges only answerable to fellow
bar members or other community or political persons who
helped to select them. Some even argue that most nominating
commissions are attorney “centric,” which further removes
the public from the judicial selection process. Various other
challenges have been raised against the merit selection sys-
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tem; for example, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina
recently denied a judge’s chal-
lenge to South Carolina’s merit-
selection system based on a sep-
aration-of-powers argument.156
In another example, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
missed a challenge to Alaska’s
merit-selection system on the
basis that it violates the Equal
Protection Clause.157 In that
case, the plaintiffs argued that because 3 of the 7 members of
Alaska’s nominating commission “are appointed by the Alaska
bar association’s Board of Governors, and because Alaska
lawyers have a greater voice in the selection of the Board of
Governors than non-lawyers, the state’s non-lawyers are
impermissibly denied an ‘equal voice’ in the selection of state
court judges.’“158
Further, special interest groups can still play a role in merit-
based selection if they have influence over members of the
nominating commission or the judicial performance commis-
sions who are typically political appointees.159 These commis-
sions change with party politics and may influence whether a
retention recommendation is given to a judge. Ten states use
judicial performance commissions, which survey individuals
who have interacted with the judge to evaluate the judge’s legal
ability, integrity, communication skills, temperament, and
administrative capacity.160 One could imagine, however, scenar-
ios where the data used in those commission surveys becomes
misleading or flawed. Hypothetically, a judge may receive a “do
not retain” recommendation from a commission with only five
negative responses to a survey, where there were only ten total
responses from a specific category of respondents, i.e. law
enforcement. The commission may then state that 50% of that
respondent category—law enforcement in this example—rec-
ommends that the judge not be retained. As a result, a mere five
individuals may have the power to affect a judge’s career. This
is particularly troublesome in those states that have a manda-
tory threshold percentage to actually receive a “retain” recom-
mendation from a commission. Additionally, there may be a
disproportionate amount of responses in a given category that
may also affect the judge’s ratings. For example, if a judge is
perceived to be defense oriented and he or she receives 100
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responses from the general category of attorneys, only 20 of
whom are defense attorneys and 80 of whom are prosecutors,
the judge is unfairly penalized because the responses were not
weighted.
While the debate over merit selection versus election
ensues; no one seems to be proposing lifetime appointments as
a method of judicial selection. But given the fact that the fed-
eral government and three states appoint judges without term
limits, and the fact that judicial elections garner much disfavor
due to judicial campaign activity,161 the appointment method is
now certainly worthy of entering the debate. This approach
would be consistent with how judges were first selected in the
U.S. and it would eliminate some of the concerns raised by the
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in White, Caperton,
and Citizens United, in that it would extricate judges from all
judicial campaign activity. The proponents of lifetime appoint-
ments argue that when judges are insulated from political
activity, they become more impartial.162 Opponents would
argue that, similar to merit-based systems, unlimited tenure
would diminish the democratic process by taking away the
public’s ability to vote in judicial elections. The opponents
would also argue that, even worse than the merit-selection and
retention system, unlimited tenure denies the public the
chance to evaluate judges whatsoever—there would be no
electoral mechanism for the removal of a judge, and thus
judges would become less accountable to the public. Despite
these concerns, every judge at every level in every state is
always subject to a removal mechanism for cause.
The scholars, political scientists, experts in judicial selec-
tion, and professors in academia, take differing views on the
subject. Some scholars believe that elective and appointive sys-
tems do not differ much in their actual operation.163 This is
due in part to the fact that “most incumbent judges are rarely
opposed for reelection, and the overwhelming majority of
judges who face the voters retain their seats.”164 But retention
vote percentages have been diminishing over time.165 Bonneau
and Melinda Gann Hall, who are experts in the areas of judi-
cial selection and politics, have empirically assessed and
attempted to debunk many of the “reformers” arguments in
their newly released book entitled In Defense of Judicial
Elections.166 These scholars believe that those promoting the
merit method use only normative information in their argu-
ments; contrastingly, these scholars use empirical information
in an attempt “to elevate the discussion of judicial selection
167. Id.
168. Id.
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cfm (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
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lot_measures (last visited Dec. 7, 2010).
171. Minnesota was unable to put a ballot measure on the 2010 bal-
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reform bills in 2010, “the first of the two bills is a public financ-
ing pilot project for the two state Supreme Court seats up for
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judges for circuit court vacancies.” Chris Dickerson, Manchin
Has Two Judicial Reform Bills, LEGALNEWSLINE.COM, January 14,
2010, http://www.legalnewsline.com/news/224992-manchin-
has-two-judicial-reform-bills.
174. “Recent reform efforts have failed to get through the Legislature
so Texans can vote on changing the system. A state constitu-
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Lawmakers should try again next year. Competent and impartial
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ing.” B. Davidson, Bexar Partisan Sweep Highlights Need for
Judicial Reform, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS, Nov. 3, 2010,
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/bexar_partisan_sweep_
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it to the ballot. Eagle Forum, Election Guide–Texas, http://eagle-
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2010).
175. The Missouri Bar, History of Merit Selection, supra note 45.
176. Ballotpedia, Missouri Judicial Selection Amendment, http://bal-
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beyond the hyperbolic rhetoric.”167 They conclude that elec-
tions are the best way to select judges, though they acknowl-
edge this method is not without its problems.168
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR METHOD CHANGES AND
WHY THEY FAIL
Kansas,169 Ohio,170 Minnesota,171 Nevada,172 West
Virginia,173 and Texas,174 have either tendered a proposal or are
considering changing from the election system to the merit
selection and retention system, or vice versa. Ironically, in
Missouri, a state whose name is synonymous with merit selec-
tion—i.e. “the Missouri Plan”175—there was an unsuccessful
proposal to move from the traditional merit selection plan,
through a nominating commission, to selection directly by the
governor subject to confirmation by the senate.176
Some scholars, coined the “standard account” scholars,
believe that the selection methods are chosen based upon soci-
ety’s responses to popular ideas at different historical periods.177
But other scholars believe that methods are changed and mod-
ified based upon the bargaining processes among relevant polit-
ical actors, which include their preferences at the moment and
their future political circumstances.178 For example, which
method prevails is directly related to whether the political
actors believe that they will remain in power and have an
obliged judiciary.179 These scholars would also argue that the
Jackson Democracy Movement was due to the nation’s lawyers
seeking prestige as potential judges and not because of societal
sentiment.180 These scholars
have supported their position
with empirical data.181
The reason proposals for
changes in these methods fail or
succeed is influenced by cultural
and socio-political considera-
tions. According to sociologist
Ann Swidler, culture is like a
“tool kit” that people may use “to
solve different kinds of prob-
lems.”182 A change in method
could create “culture shock,”
which “grows out of the difficulties in assimilating the new cul-
ture, causing difficulty in knowing what is appropriate and what
is not.”183 Consider as an example if the judges, lawyers, and the
electorate in Colorado, a merit-selection state, or Louisiana, an
election state, were suddenly required to switch to the other
method. This would be tantamount to telling those judges and
others that they now have to speak Chinese without having
taken a course in the language. These judges are indoctrinated
and inculcated into their state’s existing selection method.
Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, argued
“that people are unlikely to jettison an unworkable paradigm,
despite many indications that the paradigm is not functioning
properly, until a better paradigm can be presented.”184 If a better
paradigm is presented and a change is accepted, the next step
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http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/us/politics/23states.html?_
r=1.
187. American Judicature Society, Judicial Campaigns and Elections:
Campaign Financing, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_
selection/campaigns_and_elections/campaign_financing.cfm?sta
te= (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
188. DENISE ROTH BARBER, NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON MONEY IN STATE
POLITICS, CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (Mar.
2, 2010), http://www.followthemoney.org/press/Report
View.phtml?r=414.
189. National Center for State Courts, Judicial Selection and
Retention FAQs, http://www.ncsc.org/topics/judicial-
officers/judicial-selection-and-retention/faq.aspx (click on the
hyperlink entitled “Where can I find information about cam-
paign-finance law for elected state judicial officials?”) (last vis-
ited Dec. 8, 2010).
190. Alaska, Idaho, Kansas, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, and Wisconsin. Id.
191. Neal Peirce, Big Money, Attack Ads Infect Judicial Elections,
CITIWIRE.NET, Aug. 26, 2010, http://citiwire.net/post/2231/.
192. American Judicature Society, Judicial Campaigns and Elections:
Campaign Financing, supra note 187.
193. Office of the New Mexico Secretary of State, Voter Action Act,
http://www.sos.state.nm.us/temp.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2010);
see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-2, 3 (making public funding
available to any “covered office,” which is defined as “any office
of the judicial department subject to statewide election”).
194. Peter Hardin, WI Senate Votes to Close ‘Issue Ad’ Loophole, GAVEL
GRAB, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.gavelgrab.org/?p=7035.
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(2010), http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/JudgingQuality
JudSelectMethods.pdf.
196. For a full discussion from the Brennan Center, see generally
DEBORAH GOLDBERG, PUBLIC FUNDING OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS:
FINANCING CAMPAIGNS FOR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS (2002),
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/ji3.pdf.
197. AM. BAR ASSOC. STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE,
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 5 (2002), available at
http: / /www.abanet .org/ judind/pdf /commiss ionreport
4-03.pdf. 
198. Posting of Zachary Proulx to the Brennan Center for Justice blog,
Also a Winner: Public Funding, http://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/archives/also_a_winner_public_funding/ (Nov. 10, 2008).
would be to implement a
change management compo-
nent.185
V. INTERIM REMEDIES
A. Campaign Finance and
Public Finance Laws
Prior to Citizens United, 24
states had laws banning or
severely limiting corporate
electioneering,186 and 16 states
either limited or completely
banned corporate contribu-
tions to candidates.187 The
Supreme Court’s decision in
Citizens United will effect the
removal of these corporate
expenditure limits or bans. The
National Institute on Money in State Politics noted the effect of
the Court’s decision:
The “Citizens United v FEC” ruling by the U.S.
Supreme Court has no effect on campaign limits in
place at the state and federal levels but may effectively
overturn laws in 24 states that ban or restrict corpora-
tions from funding [advocacy] for or against state can-
didates. In the 22 states that prohibit corporations from
giving to candidates, individuals contributed about half
of the money raised by candidates and non-individuals
provided less than one-fourth. The reverse is true in the
28 states that allow corporate giving.188
Elected judges are generally subject to the same state cam-
paign finance laws as other state officials unless there are stated
exceptions for the judiciary, but even then the laws vary with
the level and jurisdiction of the court.189 There are seven states
that specifically limit judicial campaign contributions.190 One
way to avoid the potential impact of Citizens United on judicial
campaigns is to make a distinction between general elections,
which was the concern in Citizens United, and judicial elec-
tions. The United States Supreme Court opinions are typically
narrowly tailored and only apply to the facts of the case before
it. Given this potential distinction, state prohibitions on cor-
porate contributions to judicial elections might be upheld. 
If such a distinction is not recognized, a logical choice for
states might be to replace prohibitions and limitations on cor-
porate spending with public financing for judicial campaigns.
Some states seem to be moving in this direction,191 and a few
have already provided for public financing of judicial elections.
In 2002, North Carolina passed the Judicial Campaign Reform
Act, which provides for full public funding for state appellate
and supreme court elections.192 Similarly, in 2007, New
Mexico amended their Voter Action Act to allow judicial can-
didates in contested primary and general elections for appel-
late and supreme court seats to opt for public financing.193 In
2009, “Wisconsin passed a bill to curb the influence of special-
interest spending in state Supreme Court elections by support-
ing qualifying candidates with taxpayer funding.”194 In West
Virginia the legislature began a pilot program for public financ-
ing for judicial vacancies.195 The Brennan Center for Justice at
NYU School of Law,196 the ABA, and the Committee for
Economic Development all support full public financing of
judicial elections as a way to prevent the perceived or real par-
tiality that may be caused by campaign contributions to judi-
cial elections.197 Although public financing of campaigns is
strictly voluntary, it has seen many success stories.198
Despite the fact that many favor public financing, there are
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199. Two lawsuits have challenged portions of Wisconsin’s public
financing statute in federal court. See Wis. Right to Life Political
Action Comm. v. Brennan, 2010 WL 933809, at *1 (W.D. Wis.
March 11, 2010); Koschnick v. Doyle, 2010 WL 897360, at *1
(W.D. Wis. March 11, 2010).
200. 2010 WL 3267528, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 29, 2010).
201. Statement of Judge Kevin S. Burke, Hennepin County District
Court Judge, Minnesota.
202. See, e.g., Louisiana Supreme Court, Louisiana Judicial Campaign
Oversight Committee, http://www.lasc.org/judicial_campaign_
oversight.asp (last visited Dec. 8, 2010); American Judicature
Society, Judicial Campaigns and Elections:  Campaign Oversight,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/campaigns_an
d_elections/campaign_oversight.cfm?state= (discussing the
activities of campaign oversight committees in various states)
(last visited Dec. 8, 2010); see also Richard A. Dove, Judicial
Campaign Conduct: Rules, Education, and Enforcement, 34 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1458–62 (2001) (discussing campaign over-
sight efforts in Georgia, Michigan, Alabama, Ohio, and New
York).
203. American Judicature Society, Judicial Campaigns and Elections:
Campaign Oversight, supra note 202.
204. See Press Release, Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct
Committee, Candidates Sign Campaign Conduct Pledge (Sept. 8,
2007), http://www.loubar.org/jccc/kjccchome.htm.
205. Id.
206. National Center for State Courts, Operating Effective Judicial
Oversight Committees, http://www.judicialcampaignover
sight.org/resourcecenter/index.html (last visited Dec. 8, 2010). 
207. Schotland, supra note 135, at 1103.
208. For example, North Carolina, which elects their judges at every
level, merely requires a candidate to be licensed to practice law.
American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection:
Selection of Judges, supra note 7.
209. See JUDITH S. KAYE, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, THE
STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 5 (2006), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
admin/stateofjudiciary/soj2006.pdf (discussing the merits of
establishing a judicial qualification commission). 
210. John D. Feerick, Why We Seek Reform, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3,
12 (2007).
cases challenging it on First Amendment grounds.199 In a
notable example, the United States Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari over a First Amendment challenge to
Arizona’s public financing statute in Arizona Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett.200 In the meantime, how-
ever, Citizens United may pave the way for unbridled corporate
contributions to judicial campaigns in states where there are
no limits on corporate contributions to elections. But all of the
concerns over campaign contributions to judicial campaigns
may take a backseat if judges consistently perform well. As
Judge Kevin Burke put it “the best anecdote or vaccine to all of
the problems with the methods is consistently good perfor-
mance by the courts. If there is public satisfaction with the 100
million cases heard each year, even Bill Gates won’t be able to
buy a judge.”201
B. Oversight Commissions
There has been a continuing call for the creation of judicial
oversight commissions.202 The oversight performed by such
commissions ranges from judicial education programs to an
examination of judicial codes. For example, in 2006, the
Kentucky Judicial Campaign Conduct Committee was
formed, an unofficial, non-partisan organization. The
Committee’s objectives include educating the public “about
the important differences between judicial campaigns and
campaigns for partisan political office,” helping candidates
“campaign in an ethical and dignified manner,” monitoring
advertising “to detect and deter improper campaigning,” and
investigating complaints “about unfair campaign tactics and
[issuing] public statements about such tactics.”203 The com-
mittee also asks judicial candidates to sign a campaign pledge,
which states that the candidate will conduct their campaigns
in accordance with the Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct.204
The pledge further states that candidates will not engage in
false or misleading advertising and will not make accusations
that “impugn the integrity of the judicial system, the integrity
of a candidate, or erode public trust and confidence in the
independence and impartiality
of the judiciary.”205 The
National Center for State
Courts recently added an
Internet resource to aid those
states that are contemplating
the establishment of an over-
sight committee.206 The ABA
House of Delegates has also
recommended campaign con-
duct committees.207
C. Mandatory
Qualifications
While the merit method has
minimum qualifications in
place for judicial appointments by nomination commissions,
elective states sometimes have little or no minimum qualifica-
tions for a judicial candidate.208 This might result in a new
attorney without any legal experience running against an
incumbent judge. Those states that have election methods
should consider creating or strengthening judicial qualifica-
tions. Another approach is to establish statewide systems of
independent judicial qualification commissions who will be
charged with identifying and encouraging potential candidates
to run for judicial office. These commissions would evaluate
the candidates to ensure that whoever is on the ballot is indeed
qualified.209
D. Better Voter Education and Awareness
There are some scholars who believe that the most impor-
tant agent for change lies in educating the public about the
work of judges.210 To this end judges can increase their inter-
action with citizens and educate them about the judicial
branch and the duties and obligations of a judge. But these out-
reach efforts need not be limited to judges. For example, “in
Arizona and Missouri new 501(C)(3) organizations will work
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211. Schotland, supra note 135, at 1100.
212. Alaska and Colorado (merit selection and retention); California,
Oregon, North Carolina, Washington, and New York City (elec-
tion). Id. at 1101.
213. Id. at 1100. 
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Washington Citizens’ Commission on Salaries for Elected
Officials, How Commissioners Are Selected,
http://www.salaries.wa.gov/howcommissionersareselected.htm
(last visited Dec. 9, 2010). Thank you to Mary McQueen,
President, National Center for State Courts, for the reference.
217. Bruce Finley, Performance Reviews Proposed for Judges, THE
DENVER POST, Oct. 3, 2006; INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, SHARED EXPECTATIONS:  JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT 24 (2006),
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/SharedExpectations.pdf.
218. For example, Colorado permits complaints about district com-
missions to the overarching state commission, but there is no
further process other than litigation. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
5.5-103(1)(p) (stating the “the state commission shall not have
the power or duty to review actual determinations made by the
district commissions”). 
219. For an extensive report on the subject of judicial quality and
judicial discipline, see REDDICK, supra note 195. The report sug-
gests that the merit method may produce fewer unfit judges than
judicial elections. Id. at 6. Another scholar found a “sharp dis-
tinction” between discipline rates of judges initially appointed
and those who are elected, with more disciplinary actions
regarding elected judges in at least three states. See Schotland,
supra note 135, at 1087–88.
220. For a collection of sources regarding the affect of judicial selec-
tion on sentencing practices, tort awards, frequency of litigation,
and frequency of discrimination suits, see Schotland, supra note
135, at 1087 n.36.
221. See M.L. HENRY, JR. ET AL., THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN AND
MINORITIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS
(1985) (determining that findings indicate that appointment and
merit-selection systems increase minority judicial representation
to a greater extent than elective systems); see also Kevin M.
Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the Judicial Merit
Selection Process: A Statistical Report, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL
SELECTION 7 (Am. Judicature Soc’y ed. 1999). But see Webster,
supra note 153, at 33 (“Some conclude that the method of selec-
tion has little effect upon the number of women and minorities
reaching the bench. Others conclude that, while contested elec-
tions result in fewer women and minorities reaching the bench
than do other systems, women and minorities generally fare bet-
ter under appointive systems than under ‘merit’ systems. Still
others insist that ‘merit’ systems bring the greatest number of
women and minorities to the bench. The answer to this apparent
conundrum may lie in the scope of, and methods used in, the
various studies.” (footnotes omitted)).
222. E.g., Dubois, supra note 133.
directly on public education
about courts and law.”211
Similarly, voter guides are
utilized in both retention
campaigns and election cam-
paigns.212 More states and
local governments should
consider these voter-educa-
tion efforts.
E. Extended Term Lengths
There are many benefits to
lengthier judicial terms of
office no matter what the
selection and retention method. For the election method, a
lengthier term means less campaigning and fundraising and
therefore less pitfalls for judicial conduct violations.213 It also
allows the judge to focus on the bench matters as opposed to
election matters.214 In all systems, a lengthier term would
make the position more appealing to potential judicial candi-
dates and support more judicial independence.215
F. Randomly Selected Citizen Commissions,
Independent Paid Evaluators, Threshold Responses,
Weighted Measurements, and Appeals Processes 
The judicial-election method is not alone in needing some
stopgap measures. There are inherent concerns with the merit-
selection method:  the risk that appointments to nominating
commissions may be politicized, the attorney-centric composi-
tion of these commissions, and the potentially flawed method-
ology these commissions use to compile data on judges. To
avoid the concern that politics and the bar influence commis-
sions too greatly, states could form commissions in part by ran-
domly selecting citizens from the rolls of registered voters from
each congressional district. The remaining commission seats
could be filled out with political appointments from categories
such as higher education, labor, and of course, the law. This is
the process used by the Washington Citizens’ Commission on
Salaries for Elected Officials, which oversees judges’ salaries.216
To address the data-compilation problem, a state might follow
the lead of Alaska, which has a court-watcher program to eval-
uate judges.217 Regarding concerns over the potential for sta-
tistically insignificant data and skewed results, states could
require a threshold number of responses in each category of
respondents or use a weighted measurement of those
responses. States should also establish a simple appeals process
for judges who believe that a negative evaluation violated their
due process rights, as opposed to requiring a judge to appeal to
a higher-level commission or resort to litigation.218
VI. WHAT MAKES A GOOD JUDGE
The presupposition of the debate is that everyone, including
the judges themselves, want a judge to be a “good” judge, and
each method claims to produce the best judges. Measuring
judicial quality has been researched and addressed by many.
Which method produces the greatest judicial quality has been
examined through the lenses of judicial discipline,219 sentenc-
ing practices, tort awards, frequency of litigation, frequency of
discrimination suits,220 number of women and minority
judges,221 and independence versus accountability.222 The
question might also be tackled by asking what individual char-
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223. A copy of the guidelines can be viewed on the Nebraska Judicial
Branch’s website. Nebraska Judicial  Branch, American Bar
Association’s Guidelines for Reviewing Qualifications of
Candidates for State Judicial Office, http://supreme
court.ne.gov/commissions/aba-manual.shtml (last visited Dec. 9,
2010).
224. JOHN ADAMS, Thoughts on Government: Applicable to the Present
State of the American Colonies (1763), reprinted in THE
REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS ch. 9 (Liberty Fund
2000).
225. Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial
“Merit” Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803, 803 n.3 (2004).
acteristics or qualities are desirable in a judge. In 1984, the
ABA set forth the favored personal characteristics for a judge as
integrity, legal knowledge and ability, professional experience,
judicial temperament, diligence, health, financial responsibil-
ity, and public service.223 John Adams, in Thoughts on
Government, stated that judges “should be always men of learn-
ing and experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great
patience, calmness, coolness, and attention. Their minds
should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not
be dependent upon any man, or body of men.”224 Given this
quote, it seems the merit-selection method may have an edge
because it is easier for nominating commissions to ensure the
presence of these qualifications, while at the same time judges
will not be dependent on a “body of men.” But one should bear
in mind that either method of selection—merit or election—
has the potential to produce good judges. If the electorate is
educated and the qualifications to run for office are high, the
judge that is selected through the election method may also
possess these desired traits. On the other hand, one must also
remember that these desired qualities and characteristics are
dynamic, not static—a judge selected through the merit
method may ultimately become a “bad” judge. And even if the
backgrounds and characteristics of judges are carefully scruti-
nized under both methods, a “stellar resume does not neces-
sarily indicate an excellent analytical mind or first-class judi-
cial craftsmanship.”225
VII. CONCLUSION 
The various methods currently used for selecting judges
have their roots in U.S. history. What began as the lifetime
appointments method morphed into the three methods that
can be seen in action in the states today:  appointment, elec-
tion, and merit selection. Movements involving politicians,
organizations, and the electorate precipitated the development
and popularity of each method. These methods have become
more complex over time, with the states either modifying them
or toggling between them. This complexity is now com-
pounded by the Supreme Court’s decisions in White, Citizens
United, and Caperton, which have all advanced issues related to
judicial elections and campaigns, including free speech and
campaign finance. These three cases impact almost all judges,
regardless of how they are selected. Merit-selected judges may
face the prospect of campaigning during retention elections,
and thus, like their elected counterparts, may be affected by
the ruling in Citizens United. It is only the lifetime appointed
judges that need not concern themselves with the implication
of that case. 
But even though merit-selected and appointed judges may
be able to elude the potential pitfalls of judicial campaigns,
they must remain cognizant of the propriety of commenting on
controversial issues that may come before the court—such
comments now seem constitu-
tionally sanctioned after the
Supreme Court’s decision in
White. Although a judge up for
retention may not be as obliged
to comment or announce their
views as often as their elected
colleagues who are conducting
a campaign, they may still
make statements on controver-
sial issues that will be impacted
by White. While the White case
opens the door to judicial
speech on controversial mat-
ters, the adoption and imple-
mentation of the 2007 ABA
Code will hopefully clarify
where the outer bounds of
White’s implications lie.
Because Caperton intimated
that judges might have to recuse themselves for perceived
favoritism or partiality, this case may also impact both merit-
selected and appointed judges.  Despite the free speech protec-
tions  in White, these judges might still face recusal or disqual-
ification under Caperton if they comment or announce their
views on a matter that later appears before them. Additionally,
considering Caperton alongside Citizens United and the result-
ing clamor over funds being raised in judicial elections, judges
need to be aware of who is contributing to their campaigns and
the amount of funds given, and whether those two factors may
create a perceived or actual bias with respect to any parties
appearing before them. Collectively, these recent Supreme
Court cases affecting the judiciary still leave much to be
resolved.
These three cases, along with the ever-increasing funds
raised in judicial campaigns and the continued dissatisfaction
with the judiciary as a whole, have reignited the two-century
old debate about which method of judicial selection is the best.
Asking what method is “best” begs the question of what
method produces the “best” judges. The answer depends upon
which lens you are looking through. But even then, one must
remember that a judge’s behavior and conduct may be
dynamic, not static.
From the inauguration of the U.S., there have been many
arguments for and against the varying methods of selecting
judges. Although the election method may appear to be in dire
straits, no one method is free from controversy, no one method
is perfect, and there is no silver bullet for attaining perfection.
What history tells us is that what a particular method claims to
accomplish and what the evidence suggests that it accom-
plishes are sometimes different. More importantly, history tells
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226. In 2000, the National Center for State Courts organized the
National Summit on Improving Judicial Selection under the
leadership of Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas R.
Phillips and Texas Senator Rodney Ellis. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL SUMMIT ON
IMPROVING JUDICIAL SELECTION (2001), http://www.ncsc
online.org/wc/publications/Res_JudSel_CallToActionPub.pdf.
The Call to Action included twenty recommendations, which for
the most part have gone unanswered with the exception of a fol-
low-up Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment, which urged bar associations to take the lead in
forming judicial campaign conduct committees. See NAT’L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, SYMPOSIUM ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN CONDUCT
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2002), http://www.ncsc
online.org/WC/Publications/Res_JudSel_JudCampCondEvt
Pub.pdf. In 2005, “a conference of 38 states’ chief justices, jus-
tices, judges, and others,” sent to the Conference of Chief
Justices a call to action that stated, “In the end each State must
make its own decisions on what is a suitable selection system.”
Schotland, supra note 135, at 1090. In 2006, the New York State
Judicial Institute held the Symposium on Enhancing Voter
Participation on Judicial Elections. Joy Beane, Judicial Institute
Hosts Voter Education Symposium, BENCHMARKS, Summer 2006, at
8, available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/
benchmarks/issue4/votereducation.shtml. In 2007, California’s
Judicial Council formed the Commission for Impartial Courts,
including the Task Force on Judicial Selection and Retention,
which is designed to evaluate “any proposals to improve the
methods and procedures of selecting and retaining judges.”
California Courts, Commission for Impartial Courts,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/tflists/commimpart_about.htm.
In 2009, Northwestern University School of Law hosted a panel
of judges and professors to debate and discuss the issue of how
to select judges, 
us that the debate may go on forever without any true resolu-
tion. While this Paper did not attempt to construct a hypo-
thetical, perfect method, it did present some interim remedies.
In the context of judicial elections, these measures include
campaign finance reform, public financing of judicial cam-
paigns, oversight commissions, mandatory qualifications,
extended term lengths, and improved voter education and
awareness. In the context of the merit method, these measures
include randomly selected citizen nominating commissions,
independent court evaluators, and improved court evaluation
data through threshold responses, weighted measurements,
and an appeals process for negative evaluations.
Although judges’ behavior and actions may be unfairly
influenced by the judicial selection method used in their state,
there are several means for keeping this undesirable conse-
quence in check, including case law, advisory opinions, and
judicial codes of conduct. But these factors should only serve
as a baseline for what is acceptable conduct for a judge—it is
not enough for judges to merely seek technical compliance
with the fluctuating methods of selection and retention or the
mechanics of judicial directives and mandates. Judges should
take a leadership role and become visionaries. In this role,
judges may encourage those individuals and organizations
engaging in the judicial-selection debate to consider using
their energy, talent, and capital to collaborate across the ideo-
logical divides and explore a selection method that both accen-
tuates the positive and eliminates the negative aspects of the
existing methods. This exploration must include sensitivity to
the inculcated cultural and socio-political differences between
all judges and all methods. It is not enough to substitute one
method for another. To do so would be akin to replacing an
engine in a car that has electrical problems in the hope that it
would run more efficiently.
Building upon the extensive literature, the dearth of studies,
and the numerous prior national and statewide summits and
symposia on the subject matter,226 judges could harness and
capitalize on the new fervor in the debate and seek to reframe
it. To this end, the American Judges Association could build
upon its previous White Paper on fairness, and continue to
enhance the credibility of judges, by proposing and hosting a
think tank, summit, or symposium on this subject. This
approach should not only include judges, scholars, organiza-
tions, and lawmakers, as was done in the past to some degree,
but should also include a missing component:  the socio-cul-
tural experts. This addition could address the difficulty with
paradigm shifts, cultural change, and change management.
This approach will forge relationships, advance the discus-
sions, and hopefully create a new blueprint for judicial selec-
tion. We as judges need to look outside ourselves, think out-
side the box, shift the paradigm, and consider creating a selec-
tion method that recognizes and reinforces the true objective
of selecting and retaining judges, that is, impartiality, indepen-
dence, and accountability. The citizenry needs to trust that
when judges are given a choice between impartiality and bias,
honesty and dishonesty, and reason and capriciousness, judges
will invariably choose the more honorable of these concepts.
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Service Authority, the Personnel Board for the City and County of
Denver, the Denver Bar Association's Conciliation Panel, and the
Board of Directors of the Colorado Women's Bar Association, and
she is currently the president of the Women's Bar Association
Foundation. She has published several articles and has been an
adjunct professor of law at the University of Denver College of
Law. Celeste has received the Judicial Excellence Award from the
Denver Bar Association, the Judicial Excellence Award from the
Colorado Women's Bar Association, the American Association of
University Women's Trailblazer Award, and the Colorado
Humanities Award. She presently sits on the Colorado Advisory
Committee for the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.
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HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS BY STATE*
STATE START/END 
METHOD (YEARS)
# OF PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS
(e.g. Creation of Commissions, Terms,
Retirement Age) (YEARS)
VEHICLES FOR 
CHANGE
# OF FAILED
ATTEMPTS TO 
MODIFY 
ALABAMA 1819-Election
1867- Election
(5) 1819, 1830, 1850, 1867, 2009 None 4
ALASKA 1959-Merit
1980-Merit
(4) 1959, 1968, 1975, 1980 None 3
ARIZONA 1912-Election
1974-Merit
(5) 1912, 1960, 1965, 1974, 1992 Ballot Initiative 2
ARKANSAS 1836-Election
2001-Election-nonpartisan
(8)1836, 1848, 1864, 1868, 1874, 1978, 2000, 2001 Legislative Act,
Constitutional Amendment
4
CALIFORNIA 1849-Election
1998-Election
(11) 1849, 1862, 1879, 1904, 1911, 1926, 1934,
1960, 1979, 1986, 1998
Legislative Act, Ballot Initiative ?
COLORADO 1876-Election
1966-Merit
(10) 1976, 1891, 1902, 1904, 1913, 1966, 1970,
1982, 1988, 2008
Constitutional Amendment 2
CONNECTICUT 1784-Election
1818-Appointment
(8) 1784, 1818, 1856, 1876, 1880, 1965, 1982, 1986 Legislative Act,
Constitutional Amendment
0 Since 
2000
DELAWARE 1776-Appointment
1897-Appointment
(6) 1776, 1792, 1831, 1897, 1951, 1977 None 0 Since 
2000
DISTRICT OF COLUM-
BIA
1970-Appointment
1986-Appointment
(5) 1970, 1973, 1977, 1984, 1986 None 1
FLORIDA 1845-Election
2001-Election
(15) 1845, 1848, 1851, 1853, 1861, 1868, 1875,
1885, 1942, 1957, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1998, 2001
Legislative Act, Executive Order,
Constitutional Amendment
4
GEORGIA 1777-Appointment
1983-Elections-nonpartisan
(15) 1777, 1789, 1798, 1812, 1835, 1845, 1865,
1868, 1877, 1896, 1898, 1906, 1972, 1983, 2000
Legislative Act,
Constitutional Amendment
0 Since 
2000
HAWAII 1959-Appointment
1978-Appointment
(3) 1959, 1968, 1978 None 2
IDAHO 1890-Election
1934-Election nonpartisan
(6) 1890, 1934, 1967, 1980, 1982, 2003 Constitutional Amendment 5
ILLINOIS 1818-Election
1964-Election partisan
(6) 1818, 1848, 1870, 1964, 1992, 2009 Constitutional Amendment 4
INDIANA 1816-Appointment
1970-Appointment + 
Elections partisan
(7) 1816, 1851, 1871, 1881, 1891, 1970, 1986 Constitutional Amendment 2
IOWA 1846-Election
1962-Merit
(9) 1846, 1857, 1868, 1876, 1915, 1962, 1973, 1976,
2007
Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
KANSAS 1861-Election
1958-Merit
(6) 1861, 1895, 1958, 1972, 1977, 2006 Constitutional Amendment 3
KENTUCKY 1792-Appointment
1975-Election nonpartisan
(3) 1792, 1850, 1975 Constitutional Amendment 1
LOUISIANA 1812-Appointment
1904-Election
(12) 1812, 1845, 1852, 1864, 1868, 1879, 1904,
1906, 1921, 1974, 2000, 2006
Constitutional Amendment 10
MAINE 1819-Appointment
1839-Appointment
(2) 1819, 1839 None 0 Since 
2000
MARYLAND 1776-Appointment
1851-Election
(9) 1776,1837,1851, 1864, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1971,
1976
Legislative Act 0 Since 
2000
MASSACHUSETTS 1780-Appointment
1972-Appointment
(2) 1780, 1972 None 0 Since 
2000
MICHIGAN 1836-Appointment
1850-Election
(7) 1836, 1850, 1908, 1939, 1963, 1968, 1996 Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
MINNESOTA 1857-Election
1912-Election nonpartisan
(5) 1857, 1883, 1912, 1983, 1989 Legislative Act 2
MISSISSIPPI 1817-Appointment
2008-Elections nonpartisan
(11) 1817, 1832, 1868, 1890, 1910, 1914, 1993,
1994, 1999, 2002, 2008
Constitutional Amendment 1
MISSOURI 1820-Appointment
1940-Nonpartisan Selection
(13) 1820, 1849, 1872, 1875, 1884, 1909, 1940,
1942, 1945, 1970, 1973, 1976, 2008
Constitutional Amendment 5
MONTANA 1889-Election
1935-Election nonpartisan
(6) 1889, 1909, 1911, 1935, 1972, 1973 Constitutional Amendment 1
NEBRASKA 1866-Election
1962-Merit
(7) 1866, 1875, 1909, 1920, 1962, 1974, 1990 Constitutional Amendment 1
HISTORY OF REFORM EFFORTS BY STATE*
STATE START/END 
METHOD (YEARS)
# OF PROCEDURAL MODIFICATIONS
(e.g. Creation of Commissions,
Terms, Retirement Age) (YEARS)
VEHICLES FOR 
CHANGE
# OF FAILED
ATTEMPTS TO 
MODIFY 
NEVADA 1864-Election
1976-Election
(3) 1864, 1976, 1972 None 7
NEW HAMPSHIRE 1784-Appointment
2005-Appointment
(5) 1784, 1792, 2000, 2001, 2005 None 3
NEW JERSEY 1776-Appointment
1994-Appointment
(5) 1776, 1844, 1902, 1947, 1994 None 1
NEW MEXICO 1912-Election
1988-Appointment + 
Election partisan (hybrid system)
(5) 1912, 1952, 1965, 1988, 1994 Constitutional Amendment 1
NEW YORK 1777-Appointment
1977-Merit
(9) 1777, 1822, 1847, 1876, 1895, 1913, 1961,
1975, 1977
Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
NORTH CAROLINA 1776-Appointment
2002-Election nonpartisan
(7) 1776, 1868, 1967, 1977, 1996, 2001, 2002 Executive Order
Legislative Act
6
NORTH DAKOTA 1889-Election
1909-Election nonpartisan
(7) 1889, 1909, 1930, 1967, 1976, 1987, 1998 Legislative Act 0 Since 
2000
OHIO 1802-Election
1912-Election
(7) 1802, 1851, 1883, 1892, 1912, 1913, 1968 None 1
OKLAHOMA 1907-Election
1987-Merit
(5) 1907, 1909, 1967, 1968, 1987 Constitutional Amendment 2
OREGON 1859-Election
1931-Election nonpartisan
(7) 1859, 1878, 1910, 1931, 1961, 1969, 1976 Legislative Act 4
PENNSYLVANIA 1776-Appointment
1968-Election partisan
(10) 1776, 1790, 1838, 1850, 1874, 1895, 1913,
1921, 1964, 1968
Constitutional Amendment 7
RHODE ISLAND 1842-Election
1994-Merit + Appointment
(7) 1842, 1902, 1905, 1932, 1956, 1994, 2007 Legislative Act
Constitutional Amendment
0 Since 
2000
SOUTH CAROLINA 1776-Election
1996-Merit  w/Election
(12) 1776, 1778, 1790, 1865, 1868, 1895, 1911,
1976, 1979, 1984, 1990, 1996
Constitutional Amendment 4
SOUTH DAKOTA 1889-Election
1980-Merit
(4) 1889, 1921, 1972, 1980 Legislative Act
Constitutional  Amendment
1
TENNESSEE 1796-Election
1971-Merit
(8) 1796, 1835, 1853, 1971, 1974, 1994, 2001,
2009
Legislative Act 2
TEXAS 1845-Appointment
1891-Election
(6) 1845, 1866, 1869, 1876, 1891, 1965 Constitutional Amendment 12
UTAH 1896-Election
1985-Merit
(8) 1896, 1945, 1951, 1967, 1985, 1987, 1994,
2007
Ballot Initiative 0 Since 
2000
VERMONT 1777-Appointment
1974-Merit
(6) 1777, 1786, 1850, 1870, 1967, 1974 Ballot Initiative 0 Since 
2000
VIRGINIA 1776-Election
1870-Election by General Assembly
(8) 1776, 1850, 1864, 1870, 1970, 1983, 2002,
2008
Constitutional Amendment 1
WASHINGTON 1889-Election
1969-Election nonpartisan
(5) 1889, 1907, 1969, 1995, 2006 Constitutional Amendment 2
WEST VIRGINIA 1862-Election
2010-Election
(6) 1862, 1872, 1974, 2000, 2010, 2010 None 0 Since 
2000
WISCONSIN 1848-Election
1977-Election
(8) 1848, 1853, 1889, 1977, 1983, 1987, 2001,
2009
Constitutional Amendment
Executive Order
0 Since 
2000
WYOMING 1890-Elected
1972-Merit
(5 ) 1890, 1972, 1976, 1977, 2000 Constitutional Amendment 0 Since 
2000
* This appendix was compiled from information found on the American Judicature Society website, http://www.judicialselection.us/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2010).
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Evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices istaking on increasing importance as evidenced by the strug-gle over restrictions on the devices1 as well as the Supreme
Court’s recent unusual step of linking to a video featuring
footage from a police officer chasing after a speeding driver.2 As
law-enforcement officials rely more and more on this type of
evidence to issue citations and defend against criminal pro-
ceedings, courts must grapple with the admissibility of photo-
graphic and video evidence obtained from red-light cameras,
speeding cameras, and black boxes or cameras on a police car.
This article focuses on the rationales of evidence exclusion
and notes that as an intrinsic rule, or a rule focused on the pur-
suit of truth, when determining whether to admit the evidence
one must consider the three foundational factors of (1) mate-
riality and relevance, (2) authenticity, and (3) competence.3
On balance, in civil cases, courts should almost always admit
the evidence unless it is clear that it is fabricated or flawed.
They should also follow the approaches of caselaw and err on
the side of admitting the evidence but allow the defendant to
argue issues as to authenticity when determining the weight of
the evidence.  However, the balance changes in criminal cases,
which usually involve a jury and therefore also implicate jury
risks.  In these circumstances, courts should still almost always
admit the evidence, but they should recognize the potential
prejudice of videotaped evidence in particular and take steps to
mitigate it, such as reviewing the evidence early in the pro-
ceeding to make sure the evidence is not especially prejudicial.
In the special case of summary judgment or other instances
where the court takes the decision out of the hands of the jury,
the court should be especially careful to preserve legitimacy
because juries serve important goals.  More specifically, courts
should recognize the differing viewpoints of the parties as well
as the viewpoints that the evidence might elicit in jurors, par-
ticularly if the evidence is in the form of a video.  Courts
should also avoid a sensorial jurisprudence which uses lan-
guage that hints the judges themselves have fallen prey to the
biasing effects of the evidence.  Both of these steps will help the
court retain legitimacy and therefore give the court a way to
admit the evidence without placing undue import on it.
Part I briefly discusses the goals of evidence law and focuses
on the concerns underlying intrinsic rules, which are focused
on the pursuit of truth.  Part II briefly outlines my proposal.
Part II.A. discusses civil law and concludes that on balance,
this type of evidence should almost always be admitted.  In
addition, as current caselaw dictates, courts should also allow
parties to raise questions regarding the accuracy of the evi-
dence at trial.  Part II.B. turns to criminal law, where jury trials
are more frequent for cases with factual disputes. It begins by
acknowledging that while the balance regarding the potential
prejudicial effect of the evidence alters slightly—because
videos that are powerful forms of evidence are more likely to
surface in this context—procedural safeguards are sufficient to
counteract these biases and evidence still should almost always
be admissible.  Next, this article turns to jury risks and like-
wise concludes that these risks do not necessitate the exclu-
sion of evidence.  It continues by discussing how current
caselaw supports these conclusions as well as providing guid-
ance for courts in this dilemma.  Finally, this article concludes
by drawing lessons from Scott v. Harris, a Supreme Court case
involving video footage from a police officer driving after a
speeding defendant, and argues that courts should refrain from
putting too much weight on the admitted evidence, which
results in a sensorial jurisprudence, and should instead be
careful to preserve its legitimacy.
I. BACKGROUND:  INTRINSIC RULES AND THE
FOUNDATION REQUIREMENTS OF MATERIALITY AND
RELEVANCE, AUTHENTICITY, AND COMPETENCE
Before discussing the admissibility of evidence obtained by
remote-electronic devices, one must first understand evidence
law’s underlying goals.  Rules of evidence are divided into two
categories: intrinsic and extrinsic rules.4 Intrinsic rules are
concerned with facilitating the pursuit of truth.  In contrast,
extrinsic rules are concerned with advancing other policies as
exemplified by the rules regarding privilege.5 The rules gov-
erning admissions of evidence obtained from remote-elec-
tronic traffic devices are intrinsic rules because they focus on
the pursuit of truth.  As just one example, consider the best-
evidence rule in federal and state evidence law, which requires
photographs, including videos, to be the original in order to
prove its contents.6 Although “original” has been defined as
“any print” of a photograph and thus videos can be any video-
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tape of acceptable quality,7 the essential concern about the
authenticity of the evidence remains.
Given that evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic
devices are governed by intrinsic rules, judges consider foun-
dational requirements that are focused on the pursuit of truth
when determining whether to admit the evidence.  These three
factors are  (1) materiality and relevance, (2) authenticity, and
(3) competence.8 Materiality and relevance are closely tied
because evidence cannot be relevant without being material.
Material evidence must relate to a substantive issue in the case
or, in other words, be “material to the question in controversy.”9
Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of [a material fact] more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”10 Authenticity relates
to whether the evidence itself is authentic.  Finally, competence
refers to whether the evidence violates “any legislative or evi-
dentiary exclusionary policy” which in this context primarily
focuses on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and parallel state rules
regarding exclusion of evidence based on undue prejudice to
the defendant.11 Against this backdrop, this article now turns
to assessing the admissibility of evidence obtained by remote-
electronic traffic devices in civil and criminal cases.
II. PROPOSAL: COURTS SHOULD ALMOST ALWAYS
ADMIT EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY REMOTE
ELECTRONIC TRAFFIC DEVICES
When considering the three foundational factors, it
becomes clear that courts should almost always admit evi-
dence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices in civil
contexts.  However, courts should allow questions as to the
authenticity of the evidence that go toward the weight of the
evidence even after admitting it.  In the criminal context, the
weighing of the three foundational factors changes because
video is more likely to be introduced, thereby increasing the
prejudicial effects on the defendant.  However, on balance, the
evidence should still be admissible because of procedural safe-
guards mitigating this risk as well as the great probative value
of the evidence.  Jury risks do not necessitate the exclusion of
the evidence, either; indeed, current caselaw supports this
conclusion as well as suggesting guidelines like routinely
reviewing the evidence before admitting it.  Finally, when
faced with a summary-judgment case involving this type of
evidence, courts should be very cognizant of the rationales
behind why juries are in place. To preserve legitimacy, courts
should do a mental check or engage in judicial humility to be
careful to word their opinion neutrally so that they credit the
viewpoints of the driver and potential jurors as well as being
careful to avoid falling prey to undue reliance on the video
evidence and essentially adopt-
ing a sensorial jurisprudence. 
A. Civil-Law Context
In civil cases, courts should
almost always admit evidence
obtained by remote-electronic
traffic devices.  Indeed, the only
time that the court should not
be admitting the evidence is if it
is clearly fabricated, which is
highly unlikely.12 If there are minor disputes as to the authen-
ticity of the evidence, the court should err on the side of admit-
ting it but allow the defendant to raise those arguments at trial
to dispute the weight of the evidence.
At the outset, it is important to understand that traffic cita-
tions are infractions and thus will usually be heard in traffic
court or the lowest-level state court.  While there are some
variations among the states in their treatment of the citations,
it is safe to assume that the case will be heard in front of one
judge.13 Thus, because juries are not implicated in these civil
cases, the balance struck will differ from that of criminal cases.
i. Evidence obtained by remote-electronic devices almost
always satisfies the three foundational factors of material-
ity and relevance, authenticity, and competence
When considering the three factors of materiality and rele-
vance, authenticity, and competence, it becomes clear that evi-
dence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices should
almost always be admitted.
First, this type of evidence easily satisfies the materiality
and relevance factors because the photos or videos are con-
temporaneous depictions of the moment the violation
occurred.  The evidence is thus material to the legal issue, and
also relevant because the photograph or video’s existence
makes it more probable that the violation occurred.
Evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices also
satisfies the authenticity test.  First of all, this type of evidence
is contemporaneous direct evidence, which is evidence that
records the moment in controversy and proves an ultimate fact
in the case without needing intermediate inferences.14 Thus,
they are in essence “silent witnesses”15 and courts can almost
always safely admit the evidence when the government verifies
the fairness and accuracy.  The government can easily do so
through showing that the video was not altered while going
through a known chain-of-custody, bringing in a photographic
or video expert who can testify that nothing was altered or
faked,16 or even just citing which speed camera was used, as
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one state has recently
required in an effort to
address authenticity con-
cerns.17
Finally, when consider-
ing competence, the proba-
tive value of the evidence
outweighs the potential
prejudice against the defen-
dant.  As discussed earlier,
photos or videos are contemporaneous direct evidence, so they
have a very strong probative value.18 Weighed against this is
the potential prejudice against the defendant.  Here, it is
unlikely that the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced by
the admission of the evidence.  Although it is true that videos
in particular may cause viewers to overvalue the evidence,19
the fact remains that in civil matters, such biases are not as
prevalent because these cases deal with small traffic infrac-
tions.  It is difficult to imagine that a photo or video of a car
driving through a red light can cause too much sensationalism
in the viewer.  Moreover, the concern about bias is not as rele-
vant with traffic-court judges who have some experience after
regularly dealing with these types of cases.  Indeed, one study
even found that magistrate judges seemed to dismiss the
charges with great frequency,20 and so although there have
been very few studies on the bias of individual judges, it is
probably safe to assume that it seems unlikely that admitting
the evidence would unfairly prejudice the defendant.
Moreover, while the concern may take on greater weight with
appeals courts where judges may not be as experienced with
traffic matters, it is probably safe to assume that most cases end
in traffic court and it would thus be illogical to exclude the evi-
dence just because there is a slight chance that an appeals
judge would be prejudiced against the defendant.  Because
contemporaneous direct evidence is extremely probative and
the potential for unfair prejudice is not very salient, evidence
obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices satisfies all three
foundational requirements and thus should almost always be
admitted into evidence in civil cases.
ii. Current caselaw supports admitting evidence obtained by
remote-electronic traffic devices and suggests that minor
authenticity disputes should only go toward the weight of
the evidence instead of its admissibility
Current caselaw also overwhelmingly supports admitting
evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices.  In state
after state, courts generally admit the evidence.21 Although
there is some variance in how much each state has relaxed its
authentication requirements, with some still requiring a proof
of the chain-of-custody for instance,22 the government usually
easily fulfills these requirements and so courts consistently
continue to admit the evidence.
These cases also give some guidance for how courts should
be treating minor challenges to the evidence’s authenticity.  In
general, courts would do better to admit the evidence and then
have the parties raise points about the authenticity in court
instead of excluding the evidence altogether.  Indeed, appellate
courts have shown a “great reluctance”23 to limit the trial
court’s discretion, particularly because of the subjective nature
of the weighing.  Moreover, appellate courts frequently affirm
a lower court’s decision to find a violation even when the
defendant protested the admission and reliability of the evi-
dence, such as a defendant’s protestation over the admission of
results from  a photo-speed recorder24 or an objection that a
particular device was being used for the first time.25 In con-
trast, appellate courts are more likely to reverse when the trial
court finds the evidence insufficient,26 as exemplified by one
appellate court that reversed the trial court’s finding that the
dispute about the technician’s response regarding calibration of
the device was enough to find no violation.27 The same pat-
tern rises when looking at cases involving videotapes with
courts often finding that minor disputes as to authenticity
should not go toward admissibility.  Indeed, many cases
involving videotaped evidence have found that even when the
tape is edited, it should still be admitted with the determina-
tions as to the authenticity going toward the weight or credi-
bility of the evidence.28 By analogy, although the government
should certainly try to avoid editing the photo or video, these
principles should also be applied to this context.  Overall,
caselaw dealing with both evidence obtained from remote-elec-
tronic traffic devices as well as cases just dealing with video-
tape evidence both support the proposition that courts should
admit this type of evidence, but allow defendants to raise
minor disputes about the authenticity at trial.
B. Criminal-Law Context
The balance struck in civil cases involving evidence
obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices changes in
criminal cases because a jury is often introduced into the equa-
tion.  In this situation, courts should still admit the evidence,
again allowing defendants to dispute authenticity issues in
trial.  However, in cases where the court takes some portion of
the decision away from the jury, the court should take special
care when giving its opinion to avoid losing legitimacy.
Current caselaw . . .
overwhelmingly
supports admitting
evidence obtained
by remote-electronic
traffic devices.
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i. Evidence obtained by remote-electronic devices almost
always satisfies the three factors of materiality and rele-
vance, authenticity, and competence, although admittedly
the balance does alter slightly when evaluating competence
In criminal-law cases, the same three foundational require-
ments of materiality and relevance, authenticity, and compe-
tence must still be satisfied.  Materiality and relevance as well
as authenticity are still easily satisfied as discussed in Part II.A.
However, while overall the competence factor still weighs in
favor of admission, introducing a jury will give more weight to
concern about the prejudicial effects on the defendant, partic-
ularly in the case of videotaped evidence obtained from a
remote-electronic  traffic device.
As discussed earlier, videotape evidence is by its nature
“extremely persuasive, vivid, and unforgettable.”29 However,
while civil cases typically involve non-sensationalist evidence
such as photos of a car running a red light, criminal cases are
more likely to involve videos of a car chase or other potentially
provocative images.  Studies show that viewers are generally
likely to accept the contents of the video as truth.30 In addi-
tion, there have been startling studies that demonstrate that
viewers are more likely to see a confession as more voluntary
and correspondingly that the defendant is more guilty when
the video shows only the defendant as opposed to when it
shows both the defendant and the police officer eliciting the
confession.31 While no such similar studies have been done
with car chases for instance, it may well be possible that a view
from the dashboard of a police car will cause viewers to be
more likely to view the defendant as the one voluntarily begin-
ning the car chase and therefore more at fault, which may
impact related civil cases in which a private party seeks dam-
ages based on a claim that officers used excessive force and the
jury must determine the relative culpability of the parties.32
However, a critical difference between videotaped confessions
and video obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices is
that law enforcement cannot significantly alter the placement
of the camera.  Thus, even if there were a bias in car chase or
arrest scenarios, there seems to be little that can be done to
avoid it.  Such instances are more spontaneous, and it obvi-
ously is not feasible to pause the chase in order to have a police
car drive to the side of both vehicles or to have a helicopter fly-
ing overhead in order to get a wider view and avoid the poten-
tial bias that may result from a limited perspective.  Even if the
concerns about bias have greater strength because the viewer is
a lay juror instead of the more experienced judges in traffic
court, the party will have the opportunity to counteract this
bias through giving his or her version of events at trial with the
added benefit that he or she will be much more likely to tell the
truth because of the admission of this evidence.  In the end, as
contemporaneous direct evi-
dence, these videos hold great
probative weight, and as such,
courts should continue to
admit them into evidence when
balancing it against its prejudi-
cial effects.  Thus, while the
potential prejudicial effect of
the evidence has greater weight
in the criminal context, overall,
the evidence should still be
introduced because it satisfies the foundational requirements.
ii. Exclusion of evidence as a form of jury control
With the introduction of a jury, it becomes necessary to also
discuss the risks attendant with that jury and why such risks
do not necessitate the exclusion of evidence obtained from
remote-electronic traffic devices.  Indeed, although evidence
law can be explained through a combination of theories, the
jury-oriented one is the most orthodox and indeed the most
relevant concern, particularly in exclusion-of-evidence con-
texts.33 In general, there are three risks associated with juries:
(1) bias, (2) lawlessness, and (3) adjudicative incompetence.
Bias is the concern that jurors have preexisting biases because
of their backgrounds and that these biases will influence their
judgment.  Lawlessness is the concern that juries in their dis-
cretion may sometimes flout the law.  Finally, adjudicative
incompetence is the concern that as lay people, jurors will mis-
understand the value of the evidence or fail to understand the
legal instructions and therefore come to the wrong conclu-
sion.34 All of these risks could and indeed should be counter-
acted if the court follows certain procedures and thus they do
not necessitate that the evidence obtained from remote-elec-
tronic traffic devices be excluded.
First, bias is often dealt with in the jury-selection process.
In fact, one could even show the evidence, particularly if it is
videotape evidence, to the potential jurors in voir dire to deter-
mine whether some jurors have particularly strong biases
toward the video.35 However,  jurors probably would not have
an especially strong prejudicial reaction solely due to a photo
of a car running through a red light.  The same likely holds
true even if the evidence is a video of a car chase because again,
prior biases would likely be uncovered in the normal jury-
selection process, and it seems unlikely that a juror would have
such a strong individualized reaction to seeing the video that
he or she should be individually removed through the chal-
lenge-for-cause process.  Thus, the normal jury-selection
process should probably be enough to counter bias concerns
even in this context.
With the 
introduciton of a
jury, it becomes
necessary to also
discuss the risks
attendant with
that jury . . . .
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(2d ed. 1991) (citing cases).
53. See State v. Burdgess, 434 So. 2d 1062 (La. 1983).
Second is the concern
about lawlessness, which
again is dealt with through
jury-control processes.  To
make sure juries follow the
law, jurors swear an oath to
do so and legal instructions
will instruct them on what to
do.36 In conjunction with this is the negative control of not
telling juries about their power to potentially ignore law,37 and
instead leaving the decision up to them.38 Although these con-
trols are somewhat week, this is all that can be done to prevent
jury lawlessness because the jury system itself is ambivalent
about the jury's power. That is, although lawlessness can be
seen as a negative risk, it can also sometimes work as a posi-
tive factor or a defensive safeguard when the law itself may be
unjust, which is why there cannot be excessive controls to sti-
fle jury lawlessness.39
Finally, there is the concern about adjudicative incompe-
tence.  To begin, one must have a point of comparison—
namely, what standard of competence are we comparing the
jury’s to?  Some might frame the issue by comparing jurors to
a competent individual judge such as perhaps those in the traf-
fic court.40 However, a better starting point is to recognize that
all jurors and judges have some biases or frailties in reasoning
that might lead them to make faulty decisions,41 and thus, any
decision to admit or exclude evidence on this basis must be
justified because it will truly be effective in eliminating or sub-
stantially reducing these problems.
In the context of evidence obtained by remote-electronic
traffic devices, photos do not seem to be the type of evidence
that is difficult to evaluate and might cause either jurors or
judges to make a faulty decision.  However, videotaped evi-
dence is of greater concern because of its more persuasive
effect as discussed earlier in this article.  Nevertheless, there
are procedural safeguards in place to address this problem such
as allowing the party to raise arguments about the weight of
the evidence, which in turn should ideally make it easier for
jurors to evaluate that evidence.  Moreover, judges have the
power to overturn a verdict if they truly believe the jury has
erred.  These and other procedural safeguards are enough to
counter this potential risk, and given the great probative value
of the evidence, it should still be admitted.  In sum, although
the introduction of juries into the criminal context has also
introduced the three attendant risks of bias, lawlessness, and
adjudicative incompetence, steps can be taken to reduce these
risks and therefore they do not necessitate an exclusion of evi-
dence obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices.
iii. Current caselaw: A trend in admitting evidence and a
source of guidance for ways to counter the bias effect
As in civil cases, courts also generally admit evidence
obtained by remote-electronic traffic devices in the criminal
context.42 More importantly though, cases dealing with video-
tape evidence have recognized the bias effect of the video and
have taken steps to counteract it, thereby giving guidance to
how courts should respond in this context.  These solutions
can easily be applied to videotape evidence obtained from
remote-electronic traffic devices, and particularly videotaped
evidence obtained from a police car dashboard such as when
the police officer is chasing after a car43 or even arresting a per-
son during a traffic stop,44 where the concerns about bias are
most salient.
Courts should take several steps to deal with videotaped evi-
dence in criminal contexts.  First, they should do a preliminary
review of the evidence to avoid exposing jurors to potentially
inadmissible videotape evidence.45 Indeed, such a review has
become a common procedure followed by many courts46 and
should always take place if the opposing party has made an
objection to the evidence47 or made a request for in-camera
review.48 Such review can take place either before the trial, at
the very beginning of the trial if the party makes a motion in
limine, or during the trial but before the time the jury will view
the video.49 Obviously, earlier in the trial is better both to give
parties time to prepare and to conduct any editing if necessary.50
Courts should also conduct the review under the same condi-
tions that the jury will view the evidence,51 so in other words,
if the jury is only able to view the video once, then the court
should do the same.  Ideally though, both the judge and the
jury should be able to view the evidence as many times as
needed, particularly during deliberations, so that initial impres-
sions of a high-speed chase, for example, do not overwhelm the
viewer and cloud his or her judgment.  Indeed, courts often do
such preliminary reviews already52 and while the caselaw sug-
gests that it is not reversible error when a court does not review
the video before playing it back for the jury,53 particularly if it
Courts should take
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REV. 838, 841 (2009) (“African Americans, low-income workers,
and residents of the Northeast [including liberals and Democrats]
tended to form more pro-plaintiff views of the facts . . . .”).
would have been admissible regardless,54 the preliminary
review is the better and recommended option for courts.55
Overall, even in the criminal context, caselaw shows that courts
are admitting evidence obtained from remote-electronic traffic
devices, and like in the civil context courts should also allow
defendants to raise questions as to the authenticity of the video.
However, with the introduction of the jury, they should follow
the steps courts have taken in other videotape cases and do a
preliminary review under the same viewing circumstances that
the jury would have in order to limit the potential prejudicial
effects of introducing the video into evidence.
iv. Summary judgment and its implications
This article would not be complete without discussing Scott
v. Harris, a Supreme Court case where the justices entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendant officer but relied
heavily on a video from the perspective of the police officer
who chased after the speeding driver and eventually rammed
his police car into the driver’s car.56 This case demonstrates the
power of video evidence and indeed provides many important
lessons about how judges should approach summary-judg-
ment cases involving videos taken from remote-electronic traf-
fic devices.  Before getting to that, however, this article will
first generally discuss the rationales for having a jury and the
dangers of admitting a video into evidence and subsequently
relying too much on it when taking a decision out of the hands
of the jury.
1. BACKGROUND: THE RATIONALES FOR HAVING A
JURY
At the outset, it is important to understand why the crimi-
nal system has a jury in the first place because it is only
through understanding the jury’s function that one can under-
stand what will be lost when a court takes a decision away
from the jury.  While there are several rationales for having a
jury, this article will only discuss three of them:  (1) they are
good fact-finders, (2) they temper the law on behalf of the
community, and (3) they legitimize the legal system.57 The
first rationale is a controversial one, and while there has been
an endless debate over whether jurors are in fact good fact-
finders,58 this article will assume that they are fairly good fact-
finders primarily because they have advantages as a group.  For
instance, group deliberation encourages more thorough analy-
sis and accurate verdicts:  collectively, they remember more of
the evidence, their differing backgrounds allow them to do a
better job interpreting the
weight and import of evi-
dence, and most importantly,
lingering biases that exist
among the jurors can be can-
celed out in the jury room.59
The second rationale is the
counterpart to the previously
discussed risk of lawlessness.
This rationale views the jury
as a defensive shield that can
infuse the community’s val-
ues while flexibly applying
the law.60 Finally, the third
and most important rationale
is that a decision by jurors has more legitimacy because the
public views decisions by members of its own community
more favorably.61
2. PROBLEMS WITH ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE IN
SUMMARY-JUDGMENT CONTEXTS
Applying these rationales to the problem of summary judg-
ment, it is clear that by admitting evidence, particularly video-
taped evidence, and then bypassing the procedural safeguards
or rationales for having a jury, new problems emerge because
the evidence may now unduly influence the judges such that
they come to an incorrect or biased decision or a decision at
odds with what the local community might have ruled.  At the
heart of all of this is the central concern that the court’s deci-
sion will lack legitimacy.
If the jury as a group is a good fact-finder, by extension,
many of the group benefits are lost with summary judgment.
This in turn means that the biases of the judges will be magni-
fied, which can be problematic given the power of video evi-
dence, and potentially lead judges to make an incorrect or
biased decision.  Recall that one of the most important advan-
tages of a group is that individual preexisting biases can be
canceled out in deliberations.  These biases still linger even
after careful jury selection and can be important, as demon-
strated by one study, which determined that when viewing a
videotape of evidence taken from a police dashboard camera
during a chase of a speeding party, African-Americans, low-
income workers, Democrats, and residents of the Northeast
were significantly more likely to favor the party being chased
by the cop.62 Jury deliberation allows jurors to air their view-
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points and come to a group
consensus about the verdict
without being overly swayed
by the video.  However, in
summary judgment, only
one or a few judges make a
decision.  That means that if
the trial judge happens to be
a lower-income Democrat,
he or she might be more
likely to rule in favor of the
speeding party.  In other
words, the judge’s individual preexisting bias may become
magnified in summary-judgment contexts.
Summary judgment involving videotape evidence is also
problematic with regards to the second rationale for juries, that
the jury tempers the law on behalf of the community.  For
instance, perhaps residents of a southern state might have dif-
ferent views than the judges on an appeals court or other
higher court,63 particularly when judges may have more privi-
leged backgrounds than the local community and thus view
the video differently.  Thus, admission of the video into evi-
dence can potentially cause a difference in the verdict a jury or
a judge might give.
Finally, summary judgment involving videotape evidence is
problematic when considering the last rationale for juries, that
they provide legitimacy to the system.  As mentioned earlier,
the public believes a decision to be more legitimate when mem-
bers of its group deliver a verdict, particularly because even if
jurors have differing viewpoints, the prevailing jurors are
obliged to listen during the critical moment of jury delibera-
tions to those who have different views; this helps to allow the
losing party to accept the verdict without experiencing a sense
of domination or subjugation.64 However, when a court gives a
verdict or a view of the evidence that the public may not credit,
the decision arguably loses legitimacy because differing view-
points are not expressed through the jury process.  By bypass-
ing the jury through summary judgment, the admission of the
evidence obtained by the remote-electronic traffic device
becomes a much bigger concern, and courts must be cautious
when dealing with this situation or risk losing legitimacy.
3. SCOTT V. HARRIS AND ITS LESSONS: WHAT
APPROACH COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW
Given that admitting videotape evidence obtained from a
remote-electronic traffic device can cause many problems in
the summary judgment context, what is the best solution?
Excluding the evidence is not ideal for all the reasons dis-
cussed earlier in this article.  However, taking a closer look at
the Scott v. Harris case can provide many lessons for what to do
and what not to do for any court facing this dilemma.
In Scott v. Harris, a police officer filmed a high-speed chase
from a camera on his dashboard and subsequently bumped the
escaping driver’s car in the rear and caused the car to crash.
The driver became a quadriplegic as a result of the incident
and sued the police officer under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 alleg-
ing that using deadly force to terminate the chase was an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.65 In an
opinion that seemed to give great weight to the evidence
obtained from the remote traffic device as exemplified by such
statements as “[we] are happy to allow the videotape to speak
for itself”66 and even providing a link to the video with the
invitation to “see for yourself,” the Supreme Court reversed the
lower courts’ findings denying summary judgment.
Scott v. Harris gives several important lessons on what
judges should and should not do when faced with a summary-
judgment case involving evidence obtained from a remote-
electronic traffic device.  Although this article will not delve
into the intricacies of all of the alternatives that the Court
might have chosen,67 it will extrapolate some general princi-
ples for courts facing summary-judgment cases involving
videotaped evidence.
First, judges faced with videotape evidence should be
aware of the potential biases and differing viewpoints that
prospective jurors might have.  As one study suggests, the
Court in Scott v. Harris was prone to naïve realism, which
means that people are good at detecting group commitments
or biases animating other people’s beliefs, but correspondingly
naïve or poor at detecting this in themselves.68 To counteract
this problem, judges should perform a judicial humility men-
tal check, or ask themselves to imagine who might disagree
with their viewpoint.69 If the other views are mere outliers,
then summary judgment is appropriate.70 However, in more
borderline cases where summary judgment may still have
been appropriate as it arguably might have been in Harris (one
study demonstrated that lay people did indeed come to the
same conclusion as the judges),71 judges still should be care-
ful in their opinion to moderate their language.  Perhaps
phrases such as “no reasonable jury could conclude other-
wise”72 might have been avoided.  In addition, perhaps more
deference should have been given to the speeding driver’s
point of view instead of hinting that the video told only one
set truth—such language indicates it is the judge’s view of the
video that is being imposed onto the parties in this case.
Again, this is undesirable because it undermines the legiti-
macy of the opinion itself.
Second, judges facing this situation should avoid sensorial
jurisprudence.  In other words, they should not accord exces-
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sive weight to evidence and use such strong phrases as “[t]he
videotape tells quite a different story,” or repeated repetitions
of what “we see” and describing the chase as a “Hollywood-
style car chase of the most frightening sort.”73 These phrases
indicate the judge may have indeed fallen prey to the inherent
biasing effects of the video that again undermines legitimacy.
While arguably appellate judges can constrain trial judges,
there is nowhere left to go for further review once the case
reaches the Supreme Court, and so higher courts in particular
should be careful about placing too much weight on a video,
especially because video evidence is known to be particularly
powerful.
Scott v. Harris provides important lessons for any court
faced with a summary-judgment case.  Regardless of why a
court decides to take a decision outside of the hands of the
jury, it must be careful to avoid writing an opinion that detracts
from its own legitimacy.  Courts should take steps to be more
neutral in their writing, to give credence to the differing view-
points of the parties as well as the viewpoints that the evidence
might elicit in jurors, and to avoid language that hints that the
judges themselves have fallen prey to the inherent biasing
effects of a video.  Such measures would be a good start to pre-
serving legitimacy when the court bypasses the jury and its
attendant justifications. Indeed, these lessons apply to any case
involving evidence obtained by remote-electronic traffic
devices in which a judge may be asked to take the decision out
of the hands of the jury.
CONCLUSION
Like it or not, evidence obtained from remote-electronic
traffic devices is here to stay and courts should be responsive
to concerns about its admissibility.  Although it seems fairly
simple to conclude that courts should almost always admit
such evidence in civil cases while allowing issues of authentic-
ity to go toward the weight of the evidence, the arguments for
admissibility change significantly in the criminal context,
which features juries.  Nevertheless, even there courts should
almost always admit such evidence.  Although the weighing of
the three foundational factors alters slightly in the criminal
context, procedural safeguards as well as the great probative
value of the evidence still weigh in favor admission.  Moreover,
the risks that come with the introduction of a jury can be miti-
gated through other means and are not enough to justify exclu-
sion of the evidence.  Caselaw supports the conclusion that the
evidence should be admitted while simultaneously providing
guidelines for future courts.  Finally, with summary judgment,
the recent Supreme Court case of Scott v. Harris perhaps serves
as a cautionary tale of how such evidence may lead judges to
make potentially inflammatory comments that seemed to give
little credence to the driver’s or potential jurors’ points of view
and indeed seemed to suggest that the judges themselves had
fallen prey to the inherent biasing effects of the video.  Courts
facing a situation where they are bypassing the jury, and there-
fore bypassing the attendant rationales for a jury, should
instead engage in a mental check of judicial humility to be sure
that they are not themselves being unduly influenced by the
evidence and thus undermining their own legitimacy.  
Evidence obtained from remote-electronic traffic devices
will only continue to take on greater importance in the coming
years. While courts should continue to admit the evidence,
they should also be highly cognizant of setting limits and
guidelines for its use.
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CTC 2011
Court Technology Conference
Long Beach, California
October 4-6, 2011
http://www.ncsc.org/conferences-and-
events/ctc-2011.aspx 
The National Center for State Courts
sponsors a court-technology conference
very other year, and October 2011 in
Long Beach, California, is the next stop.
The 2009 conference featured 125
exhibitors, 50 educational sessions, and
more than 1,000 attendees to share notes
with.  While the 2011 program isn’t set
yet, programs last time around included
things like:  how to use an electronic
trial-notes system; using social-network-
ing tools to serve the public; providing
cost-effective but high-quality computer
networking at remote judicial sites;
remote, cen-
tralized lan-
guage inter-
preting; how
to get eCourt
project fund-
ing; court
technology on a tight budget; and tips for
improving court websites. 
As the 2011 program takes shape,
you’ll find information about it at the
website noted above.
Fourth National Symposium on 
Court Management
Sponsored by the State Justice
Institute, the Bureau of Justice
Assistance, and the National Center
for State Courts.
http://www.ncsc.org/conferences-and-
events/4th-symposium/agenda.aspx 
In times of tight budgets, it’s hard to
get a chance to attend a national confer-
ence that has good speakers who are
exploring new ideas. But you can catch
whatever portions you’d like on video
from the National Symposium on Court
Management held October 27-28, 2010.
The first of these periodic symposia was
convened in 1981. The 2010 gathering
focused on managing courts in times of
budget challenge, discussing key ques-
tions like:   What are the essential func-
tions of courts? How can courts best
organize themselves to achieve those
functions? 
Several of the
p re s e n t a t i o n s
would be of
interest to most
judges, and many
would be of
interest to judges
who have admin-
istrative respon-
sibilities:
• Dr. John Martin of the Center for
Public Policy Studies in Boulder,
Colorado, addressed trends that are
shaping the state courts from 2000 to
2020.
• Dan Hall, vice president of the
National Center for State Courts,
reviewed the key principles of judicial
administration that should guide pre-
siding judges, trial-court administra-
tors, and state-court administrators.
• Administrators and judges from
Arizona, Minnesota, and Vermont
explained changes that are being made
to “reengineer” the delivery of justice
in rural, suburban, and urban settings.
• Chief justices or state-court adminis-
trators from Ohio, Texas, and Utah, as
well as court administrators and pre-
siding judges from five other states,
discussed a new set of principles for
court governance.
All of the presentations, along with
papers and some PowerPoint slides, are
available to you on the web. Also
included on the website are the results of
a survey of 1,766 members of 11 national
organizations—including the American
Judges Association—regarding the well-
being and growth of the state courts.
Take a look to see what folks like us had
to say about how courts should be gov-
erned, how well courts are doing, and
what the future holds for us.
d
PUBLICATIONS
Special Issue on Judicial Selection
The Advocate (Litigation Section, 
State Bar of Texas)
http://www.litigationsection.com/down
loads/Advocate_Vol_53_Winter_2010.pdf
If you've read the overview Mary
Celeste has provided in the latest AJA
White Paper (page 82), your next stop for
the latest thoughts on judicial selection
can be found in a special issue of the pub-
lication of the Litigation Section of the
State Bar of Texas, which is just out and
available on the web. The articles are
mostly short and easy to read; they give a
great overview both of judicial-selection
reforms and questions raised about them.
Many of the nation's top experts are
represented. For example, Prof. Charles
Gardner Geyh, an expert on judicial
ethics, provides a few thoughts about
White, Caperton, and Citizens United.
David Rottman, a
researcher at the
National Center for
State Courts who
has closely fol-
lowed the work of
judicial campaign
oversight commit-
tees, explains how
such committees
might be used to that pressure judicial
candidates not to stray too far from
accepted norms. Prof. Anthony
Champagne, a political scientist, provides
a perspective of judicial elections based
on empirical research. 
Other article topics include whether
campaign contributions are compromis-
ing judicial independence, how judicial-
selection reform may impact minority
voters, whether partisan elections are the
best means to hold judges accountable,
how federal judicial selection really
works, and how other nations pick
judges. In all, there are 16 articles. If
you're interested in this subject at all,
you'll find this special issue of interest.
The Resource Page
g
